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ARTICLES 
(IN)FORMAL MARRIAGE EQUALITY 
Michael J. Higdon* 
 
In 2015, same-sex couples throughout the United States obtained formal 
marriage equality.  But is the prospective ability to obtain marriage licenses 
sufficient to achieve Obergefell v. Hodges’s promise of equality?  What about 
individuals whose same-sex relationship did not survive—either through 
death or dissolution—to see marriage equality become the law of the land?  
Or those couples who did ultimately wed but now have a marriage that 
appears to be artificially short when considering just how long the couple 
has actually been together in a marriage-like relationship?  With marriage 
benefits conditioned not only on the fact of marriage but also the length of 
marriage, individuals in both categories continue to suffer harm as a result 
of the unconstitutional laws that prevented them from marrying at an earlier 
point in time.  Although some states have attempted to remedy this problem 
by backdating same-sex marriages, the reality is that the availability of such 
relief varies by state and, what is more, no state has yet formulated a test to 
adequately protect the interests of those individuals.  This Article is the first 
to propose a specific solution to these problems—a solution that requires 
states to formulate and adopt a new equitable remedy, referred to here as 
“equitable marriage.”  Drawing on existing equitable doctrines that states 
have already developed to extend formal family law benefits to those in 
informal family-like relationships, equitable marriage would treat same-sex 
relationships that predated formal marriage equality as the equivalent of a 
legal marriage with all the attendant rights and obligations.  In the case of 
same-sex couples who ultimately did wed, equitable marriage would require 
that the time the couple spent in a marriage-like relationship count as part 
of the formal marriage, so as to extend all marital benefits conditioned on 
length of marriage.  To succeed, claimants would need to establish that the 
couple would have wed during that time period but for the unconstitutional 
laws depriving them of that fundamental right.  Understanding the 
complexity of such an approach, this Article offers guidance on how courts 
should implement and apply equitable marriage so as to achieve full 
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marriage equality while, at the same time, resisting impermissible gender 
stereotypes and heterosexist notions of how marriage “should” look. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I made sure to add “and days past” in our vows because by the time we got 
married, we had already lived together for 42 years.  You can’t forget that. 
—Edith Windsor1 
 
On three separate occasions, the United States has witnessed large, discrete 
groups of adults simultaneously earning the right to marry the person of their 
choice—a right that had been denied them for many years.  The first occurred 
after the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment,2 which cleared the way for 
former slaves to finally enter into legal marriages.3  The second came in 1967 
 
 1. Corinne Werder, 20 Epic Edie Windsor Quotes to Always Remember Her By, GO 
MAG. (Sept. 13, 2017), http://gomag.com/article/20-epic-edie-windsor-quotes-to-always-
remember-her-by [https://perma.cc/88DJ-R9DT].  Edith Windsor was the named plaintiff in 
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 2. U.S. CONST. Amend. XIII. 
 3. Prior to emancipation, slaves were permitted to “marry,” but such unions had 
absolutely no legal effect:  “As chattel, slaves were objects, not subjects.  Marriage for them 
was not an inviolable union between two people but an institution defined and controlled by 
the superior relationship of master to slave.” TERA W. HUNTER, BOUND IN WEDLOCK:  SLAVE 
AND FREE BLACK MARRIAGE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 6 (2017). 
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after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia4 struck down 
anti-miscegenation laws in the sixteen states that still prohibited interracial 
marriage.5  The third example, which forms the basis of this Article, came in 
2015 when the Supreme Court’s ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges6 ushered in 
marriage equality for same-sex couples throughout the United States.  In each 
instance, those couples impacted by the change in law were now permitted 
to solemnize their relationships and, thus, enjoy all the legal protections that 
flow from formal marriage.  At the same time, each instance prompted the 
question of what, if any, legal effect was to be given to the time some couples 
spent in a quasi-marital state while awaiting the right to legally wed.  After 
all, to ignore those years altogether would lead to a number of legal harms—
harms inconsistent with the ideal of true marriage equality.7 
To illustrate, consider Michael Ely and James Taylor, who met in 1971 
when Michael was eighteen and James was twenty.8  The two men became 
involved and would spend the next forty-three years together, living first in 
California and later in Arizona.9  In October 2014, five days after U.S. 
District Court Judge John Sedgwick ruled that Arizona’s prohibition on 
same-sex marriage was unconstitutional,10 the two men obtained a marriage 
license and married just two weeks later.11  Sadly, their legal marriage only 
lasted six months because, in May of 2015, James died of cancer at the age 
of sixty-three.12  Michael, devastated by the loss of his partner of over forty 
years, also suffered financially given that the couple primarily relied on 
James’s employment for income.13  Michael filed for Social Security benefits 
as James’s surviving spouse, but his application was denied because of a 
provision in the Social Security Act14 that requires a surviving spouse to have 
been married to the “insured individual” for nine months to qualify for 
benefits.15  Due to the timing of James’s death—but primarily to the fact that 
the two men had been legally prohibited from getting married for the majority 
of their relationship—Michael was three months shy of meeting that 
requirement.16 
 
 4. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 5. See Carlos A. Ball, The Blurring of the Lines:  Children and Bans on Interracial 
Unions and Same-Sex Marriages, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2733, 2746 (2008) (“Despite the moral 
and practical untenability of antimiscegenation laws, they remained in place in sixteen states 
(all of them in the South) by the time the Supreme Court decided Loving v. Virginia.”). 
 6. 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
 7. See infra Part II.A. 
 8. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive & Other Relief at 2, Ely v. Saul, No. 18-cv-
0557, 2020 WL 2744138 (D. Ariz. May 27, 2020) [hereinafter Ely Complaint]. 
 9. Id. at 2–3. 
 10. See generally Connolly v. Jeanes, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (D. Ariz. 2014). 
 11. Ely Complaint, supra note 8, at 3. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). 
 15. Ely Complaint, supra note 8, at 3–4; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e)–(f), 416(c), (g). 
 16. Ely Complaint, supra note 8, at 3–4. 
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Ely and Taylor represent just one of the many same-sex couples whose 
relationships began long before marriage equality was even a consideration, 
much less a reality.  For those couples that were ultimately able to wed, their 
marriage licenses bestowed legal benefits that had been denied them for 
many years.  For instance, James Obergefell, the named plaintiff in the case 
responsible for securing this new freedom, had been living in a marriage-like 
relationship with his partner for over twenty years.17  Similarly, Edith 
Windsor, the woman responsible for ending the portion of the Defense of 
Marriage Act18 (DOMA) that excluded same-sex spouses from the federal 
definition of “spouse,”19 had been with her partner for forty years before the 
two were finally permitted to marry.20  Other same-sex couples never even 
got that opportunity as, in many cases, individuals died before they could 
legally marry the person they had been waiting to wed.  The question that 
emerges then is what remedy should apply to those in same-sex relationships 
who were either never permitted to wed or those whose eventual marriages 
fail to capture the true length of their “marital” relationships. 
In Obergefell, Justice Anthony Kennedy spoke of the “constellation of 
benefits”21 that marriage affords and two years later, the Court reiterated that 
“a State may not ‘exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same 
terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.’”22  As Ely and Taylor’s story 
illustrates, however, a number of marital benefits are tied not just to the fact 
of marriage but to the length of the marriage.23  Accordingly, if states are to 
comply with Obergefell’s directive, there must be some accounting for the 
time same-sex couples spent in relationships that—but for the legal 
prohibitions against it—would have been marriages.  And this requirement 
must apply to those who were precluded from ever marrying and those same-
sex spouses who first spent time in a quasi-marital state awaiting that right.  
To do otherwise would permit an unconstitutional law—the kind Justice 
Antonin Scalia has described as “void, and . . . as no law”24—to continue to 
harm the very population on whose behalf the law was struck down.  Such a 
result is impermissible.  As the Supreme Court has made clear, when a law 
is deemed unconstitutional, “that rule is the controlling interpretation of 
federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on 
 
 17. Tom Watts, From Windsor to Obergefell:  The Struggle for Marriage Equality 
Continued, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE S52, S60 (2015). 
 18. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 
570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 19. See generally Windsor, 570 U.S. 744. 
 20. Edith Windsor and her partner, Thea Spyer, were wed in 2007 in Canada. See id. at 
749; see also Christine L. Nemacheck, The Path to Obergefell:  Saying “I Do” to New Judicial 
Federalism?, 54 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 149, 163 (2017) (noting that, prior to marrying, the 
couple had been together for over forty years). 
 21. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 670 (2015). 
 22. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017) (quoting Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 647). 
 23. See infra Part II.A. 
 24. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 760 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(quoting Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376 (1879)). 
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direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate 
or postdate our announcement of the rule.”25 
Whereas other scholars have noted this need for some form of retroactive 
application of Obergefell,26 there is as of yet no formulation of how exactly 
courts should do it.  And to the extent courts have wrestled with this issue, 
they have taken vastly different approaches and have arrived at opposite 
conclusions.27  A few have given effect to the time same-sex couples spent 
in relationships while awaiting the right to formally wed, doing so either 
through laws relating to common-law marriage or by looking into whether 
the couple would have married earlier had that option been available to 
them.28  Others have simply refused to go beyond the dates of a legal 
marriage, thus not affording any legal significance to time spent in a pre-
equality relationship, regardless of how long that relationship lasted or the 
severity of the harms that would result from failing to count that time.29  True 
marriage equality, then, remains a work in progress.  This is problematic not 
only for the continued discrimination faced by those who—pre-Obergefell—
spent time in committed, same-sex relationships but also for the fact that the 
right to marry is a constitutionally protected right and, as such, some 
standards are required.  After all, “it is the nature of a constitution to set outer 
limits to legislative competence.”30 
There are, however, a number of thorny questions associated with any 
attempt to backdate same-sex marriages.  For instance, how does the law 
determine when a premarital relationship became sufficiently “marriage-
like” to warrant counting some portion of it toward the length of the eventual 
marriage?  Relatedly, how can the law accurately determine when a same-
sex couple would have married had they been given the opportunity?  
Further, given the discrimination faced by the LGBTQIA+ community, many 
of them might have kept their relationships secret, making it difficult for them 
to now prove the earlier existence of a marriage-like relationship.  Finally, 
given the heteronormative foundation of marriage,31 what does “marriage-
like” even mean anymore, especially when applied to a group of Americans 
whom society has for decades conditioned to view marriage as a social 
institution reserved for people who are unlike them?32  As one commentator 
 
 25. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (emphasis added). 
 26. See, e.g., Peter Nicolas, Backdating Marriage, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 395 (2017); Charles 
W. Rhodes, Loving Retroactivity, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 383 (2018); Mark Strasser, 
Obergefell, Retroactivity, and Common Law Marriage, 9 NE. U. L. REV. 379 (2017); Lee-ford 
Tritt, Moving Forward by Looking Back:  The Retroactive Application of Obergefell, 2016 
WIS. L. REV. 873. 
 27. See infra Part II.B. 
 28. See infra Part II.B. 
 29. See infra notes 179–87 and accompanying text. 
 30. Marc A. Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth as a 
Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REV. 789, 798 (1964). 
 31. Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1371 (2005) 
(referencing “[m]arriage’s heteronormative roots”). 
 32. See Yuvraj Joshi, Respectable Queerness, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 415, 444 
(2012) (“[I]t appears implausible that the law, once it has recognized same-sex marriage, will 
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said after witnessing marriage equality in the Netherlands in 1998, “it was an 
amazing feeling . . . because I had never imagined that possibility.”33 
It is the goal of this Article to provide answers to those questions.  In so 
doing, this Article seeks to offer a path forward for states as they attempt to 
give effect to the full promise of Obergefell.  That path is made easier by the 
fact that states already employ their inherent equitable powers to bestow 
family law protections on informal relationships that arose outside the legal 
requirements for family formation.34  Although none of the state remedies 
are adequate in this context, they are nonetheless instructive when it comes 
to fashioning a new equitable doctrine that would adequately address the time 
same-sex couples spent in marriage-like relationships while awaiting 
marriage equality.  Essentially, that doctrine—referred to here as “equitable 
marriage”—would treat that time as either a legal marriage or, in the case of 
same-sex couples who ultimately wed, as part of the formal marriage if the 
claimant could establish that the couple would have wed during that time 
period but for the unconstitutional laws depriving them of that fundamental 
right. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I chronicles the history of formal 
marriage equality in the United States as it applies to same-sex couples.  Part 
II then turns to informal marriage equality, focusing on how Obergefell 
stands for the proposition that, going forward, states must do more than 
simply issue marriage licenses to remedy the unconstitutional denial of same-
sex couples’ right to marry.  In so doing, Part II explores the benefits tied to 
marriage, particularly those tied to length of marriage, and how states have 
attempted to answer the question of whether Obergefell demands retroactive 
application.  Part III proposes the need for an equitable remedy that, in some 
form or another, all states must adopt.  To understand that need and what 
form the remedy might take, Part III details similar equitable remedies that 
courts have previously relied on to provide family law benefits to family-like 
relationships.  Part IV then explores how the proposed equitable marriage 
remedy would provide similar protections to those marriages that fail to 
account for informal relationships that would have been marriages had legal 
prohibitions not prevented solemnization.  As part of that proposal, Part IV 
examines how courts might apply equitable marriage, offering potential 
solutions to the complications and objections any such remedy will inevitably 
bring. 
I.  THE PATH TO FORMAL MARRIAGE EQUALITY 
In 1967, when the Supreme Court struck down state laws that prohibited 
an individual from marrying someone of another race, the Court identified 
 
develop a more nuanced understanding of sexuality that undercuts its heteronormative 
assumptions.”). 
 33. Laurie J. Kendall, Dancing with My Grandma:  Talking with Robyn Ochs About 
Complex Identities and Simple Messages in the Marriage Equality Movement, in BISEXUALITY 
AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 181, 199 (M. Paz Galupo ed., 2009). 
 34. See infra Part III. 
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“freedom of choice” as an implicit component of the right to marry.35  That 
case was, of course, Loving v. Virginia, and five years later, Richard Baker 
and James McConnell would rely on it when they became the first same-sex 
couple to challenge discriminatory marriage laws.36  The two men had sought 
a marriage license under Minnesota law, which did not explicitly require the 
two parties to be of opposite sex.37  Nonetheless, their application was 
denied, and the two men subsequently brought suit, arguing that “the right to 
marry without regard to the sex of the parties is a fundamental right of all 
persons and that restricting marriage to only couples of the opposite sex is 
irrational and invidiously discriminatory.”38 
Baker and McConnell lost both at the trial court and on appeal to the state 
supreme court.39  In ruling, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ reliance on Loving, holding that, “in commonsense and in a 
constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction 
based merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in 
sex.”40  On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the two men would lose once 
more, this time with a mere one-sentence summary disposition:  “Appeal . . . 
dismissed for want of substantial federal question.”41  And with that, the 
nation’s first legal challenge to state laws that prevented individuals from 
marrying a person of the same sex would come to an end. 
For the most part, the issue would lie dormant for the next twenty years.  
Then, in the 1990s, something happened that would cause “the issue of same-
sex marriage [to] burst into the consciousness of the American public.”42  
Specifically, three same-sex couples in Hawaii decided to apply for marriage 
 
 35. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The Fourteenth Amendment requires that 
the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations.”). 
 36. Anthony Michael Kreis, Stages of Constitutional Grief:  Democratic 
Constitutionalism and the Marriage Revolution, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 871, 881 (2018) 
(“Baker and McConnell alleged Minnesota’s marriage law ran afoul of the First, Eighth, 
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
 37. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185 (Minn. 1971) (“Petitioners contend, first, 
that the absence of an express statutory prohibition against same-sex marriages evinces a 
legislative intent to authorize such marriages.”), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) 
(mem.), overruled bv Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
 38. Id. at 186. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 187. 
 41. Baker, 409 U.S. at 810. 
 42. Arthur S. Leonard, Going for the Brass Ring:  The Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 572, 572 (1997) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE:  FROM SEXUALITY LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996)); see also 
David L. Chambers & Nancy D. Polikoff, Family Law and Gay and Lesbian Family Issues in 
the Twentieth Century, 33 FAM. L.Q. 523, 526 (1999) (noting that the Hawaii opinion “stirred 
by far the most attention, for it led to the first appellate decision in the United States suggesting 
that same-sex couples were constitutionally entitled to marry and produced a seismic political 
reaction in Hawaii and the mainland”); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Marriage Equality, 
Workplace Inequality:  The Next Gay Rights Battle, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1099, 1107 (2015) 
(“[W]hen the Hawaii Supreme Court shocked the nation in 1993 and ruled in favor of Nina 
Baehr’s petition to marry her female partner in Baehr v. Lewin, the issue of same-sex marriage 
drew prominent national attention.” (footnote omitted)). 
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licenses.43  When their applications were denied, the couples filed suit, 
arguing that Hawaii’s marriage law, which “restrict[ed] the marital relation 
to a male and a female,”44 was in violation of Hawaii’s constitution.45  The 
trial court dismissed the case.46  On appeal to the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i, 
however, the court ruled that, although there was no fundamental right to 
same-sex marriage, under the Hawaii Constitution, “[s]ex is a ‘suspect 
category’ for purposes of equal protection analysis.”47  For that reason, the 
court held that the state’s discriminatory definition of marriage was 
presumptively unconstitutional, and the state could only rebut that 
presumption by a showing that “(a) the statute’s sex-based classification is 
justified by compelling state interests and (b) the statute is narrowly drawn 
to avoid unnecessary abridgements of the applicant couples’ constitutional 
rights.”48 
On remand, Circuit Court of Hawai‘i Judge Kevin S. C. Chang ruled that 
the state failed to rebut the presumption and issued an injunction that 
prevented the state from denying licenses solely because the applicants were 
of the same sex.49  Thus, in 1996, Hawaii seemed poised to become the first 
state to recognize same-sex marriage.  However, pending appeal, Judge 
Chang issued a stay of his order, and that appeal was subsequently mooted 
in 1998 when Hawaii voters passed a constitutional amendment providing 
that “[t]he legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-
sex couples.”50  Americans did not know it at the time, but it would be 
another eight years before a state would legalize same-sex marriage, and it 
would not be Hawaii.51 
Nonetheless, the fact that Hawaii had even considered legalizing same-sex 
marriage caused great consternation among many of the other states and the 
response was swift.52  With the assumption that same-sex marriages 
performed in one state would potentially be entitled to full faith and credit in 
all others,53 many states took what they hoped would be preemptive action 
 
 43. See Steven K. Homer, Against Marriage, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505, 506 (1994) 
(“In December 1990, three same-sex couples—Ninia Baehr and Genora Dancel, Tammy 
Rodrigues and Antoinette Pregil, and Pat Lagon and Joseph Melilio—applied to Hawaii’s 
Department of Health for marriage licenses.”). 
 44. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60 (Haw. 1993), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 
576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
 45. Id. at 49–50. 
 46. Id. at 52. 
 47. Id. at 67. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See generally Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91–1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 
Dec. 3, 1996), aff’d, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997) (unpublished table decision), and rev’d, 994 
P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999), No. 20371, 1999 WL 35643448 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999) (unpublished 
table decision). 
 50. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
 51. See infra notes 77–82 and accompanying text. 
 52. See Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash:  Marriage Equality 
Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1157 (2009) (noting how events in Hawaii 
“ignited the national backlash against same-sex marriage”). 
 53. See Brian H. Bix, State Interest and Marriage—the Theoretical Perspective, 32 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 105–06 (2003) (“[T]he combination of national citizenship (as enforced 
2021] (IN)FORMAL MARRIAGE EQUALITY 1359 
and began the process of amending their constitutions to define marriage as 
being between one man and one woman.54  The hope was that, in so doing, a 
state could refuse to recognize “marriages” that did not comply.  Eventually, 
thirty-one states passed such amendments.55  Alabama, for example, passed 
the Sanctity of Marriage Amendment,56 which provided that “[t]he State of 
Alabama shall not recognize as valid any marriage of parties of the same sex 
that occurred or was alleged to have occurred as a result of the law of any 
jurisdiction regardless of whether a marriage license was issued.”57  Voters 
in the state passed the amendment with 81 percent voting in favor.58 
As political pressure mounted, Congress became involved and, in 1996, 
passed DOMA.59  The Act had two main purposes.60  The first was to declare 
that no state would be required to recognize same-sex marriages performed 
in other states.61  Second, DOMA provided that, when it came to federal law 
“the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one 
woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person 
of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”62  In other words, to the 
extent federal law conditioned marriage benefits on whether the couple was 
married in their state of residence, the federal government would exclude any 
same-sex marriages a state might recognize.  Congress took this step even 
 
by the Full Faith and Credit Clause) and the usual rules of recognizing marriages validly 
celebrated in another state, meant that . . . there was a fear . . . that all other states would have 
to recognize same-sex unions celebrated in Hawaii.” (footnote omitted)). 
 54. See William Buss & Emily Buss, Escaping the American Blot?:  A Comparative Look 
at Federalism in Australia and the United States Through the Lens of Family Law, 48 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 105, 133 n.151 (2015) (“Within twelve years of the Hawaii Supreme 
Court’s ruling, many states, including Hawaii, had added an express ban on same-sex marriage 
to their laws, and a majority of these prohibitions were ultimately adopted as constitutional 
amendments.”); Julie L. Davies, State Regulation of Same-Sex Marriage, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & 
L. 1079, 1080 (2006) (“Following the first failure of a statute banning marriage for same-sex 
couples in Hawaii, states began turning to state constitutional amendments to restrict 
marriage.”). 
 55. Kenneth P. Miller, Defining Rights in the States:  Judicial Activism and Popular 
Response, 76 ALB. L. REV. 2061, 2087–88 (2013) (“Over time, voters in thirty-one states have 
approved constitutional amendments expressly limiting the definition of marriage to a union 
between a man and a woman or, in Hawaii’s case, authorizing the legislature to do so.”). 
 56. ALA. CONST. amend. 774.  
 57. Id. art. I, § 36.03(e). 
 58. See Dave Woods, Note, Crosspollination of Same-Sex Parental Rights Post-DOMA:  
The Subtle Solution, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1651, 1677 (2014). 
 59. Mark A. Tumeo, Civil Rights for Gays and Lesbians and Domestic Partner Benefits:  
How Far Could an Ohio Municipality Go?, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 165, 169 (2002) (“In 1996, 
the United States Congress capitulated to political pressure from the conservative religious 
right and passed the Defense of Marriage Act . . . .”). 
 60. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 752 (2013) (noting that “DOMA contains 
two operative sections”). 
 61. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (“No State . . . shall be required to give effect to any public act, 
record, or judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a relationship between persons 
of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State.”). 
 62. 1 U.S.C. § 7. 
1360 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
though at that time, same-sex marriage was not recognized anywhere in the 
United States.63 
Nonetheless, just as events in Hawaii galvanized efforts to block 
nationwide marriage equality, members of the LGBTQIA+ community 
began to hope that something many of them had assumed would never 
happen in their lifetimes might instead become a reality.64  As a result, after 
losing in Hawaii, a number of activists began to target other states.  Just one 
year after Hawaii passed its constitutional amendment, those advocates 
scored a new victory when Vermont ruled that its prohibition on same-sex 
marriage violated the state’s constitution, ordering the legislature “to 
consider and enact legislation consistent with” the Common Benefits Clause 
of the state constitution.65  The court did note, however, that “[w]hether this 
ultimately takes the form of inclusion within the marriage laws themselves 
or a parallel ‘domestic partnership’ system or some equivalent statutory 
alternative, rests with the Legislature.”66  In 2000, the Vermont legislature 
would adopt the latter approach, making Vermont—if not the first state to 
allow same-sex marriage—the first to institute civil unions for same-sex 
partners.67 
After Vermont, progress toward legalized same-sex marriage slowed for a 
few years.  Then, in 2003, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lawrence 
v. Texas.68  On its face, the case merely concerned the constitutionality of 
Texas’s sodomy law, which criminalized homosexual but not heterosexual 
sodomy—a law that, according to the Court, implicated “liberty of the person 
both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.”69  Basing its 
decision on the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court ruled that the law was unconstitutional.  In so ruling, 
the Court noted that “the fact that the governing majority in a State has 
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason 
 
 63. See Tritt, supra note 26, at 880–81 (“Notably, at the time DOMA was enacted, neither 
same-sex marriage nor polygamous marriage was legal in any state, territory, or possession of 
the United States.” (footnote omitted)). 
 64. See Christopher R. Leslie, Embracing Loving:  Trait-Specific Marriage Laws and 
Heightened Scrutiny, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1092 (2014) (noting that the Hawaii decision 
“provided a glimmer of hope for same-sex couples that their country, or at least their state, 
might recognize their relationships in their lifetimes”); Tina C. Campbell, Comment, The 
“Determination of Marriage Act”:  A Reasonable Response to the Discriminatory “Defense 
of Marriage Act,” 58 LOY. L. REV. 939, 946 (2012) (noting that “Baehr v. Lewin brought hope 
to the same-sex marriage movement”). 
 65. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 889 (Vt. 1999).  The clause provides:  “That government 
is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, 
nation, or community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single person, 
family, or set of persons, who are a part only of that community.” VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7. 
 66. Baker, 744 A.2d at 867. 
 67. An Act Relating to Civil Unions, No. 91, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 72 (codified in 
relevant part at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2021)). 
 68. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 69. Id. at 562. 
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for upholding a law prohibiting the practice,”70 explicitly overruling its 
earlier decision71 in Bowers v. Hardwick.72  
The Court was careful to try to limit the reach of Lawrence.  In fact, Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion went so far as to proclaim that “[t]he present case does 
not . . . involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any 
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”73  To that point, 
however, Justice Scalia dissented, saying, “Do not believe it.”74  He 
continued: 
Today’s opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has 
permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual 
unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned.  If moral 
disapprobation of homosexual conduct is “no legitimate state interest” for 
purposes of proscribing that conduct; and if, . . . “[w]hen sexuality finds 
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can 
be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring,” what 
justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to 
homosexual couples exercising “[t]he liberty protected by the 
Constitution?”75 
Justice Scalia was not the only one to interpret the Lawrence majority opinion 
in this manner.  Shortly after the opinion was released, a case summary in the 
Harvard Law Review had this to say about the opinion:  “Lawrence suggests 
that remaining forms of government-sanctioned anti-gay discrimination—
including laws barring same-sex marriage, gay adoption, and service in the 
armed forces by gays and lesbians who acknowledge their sexual 
orientation—must either be narrowly tailored to further a compelling 
government purpose or be invalidated.”76 
In fact, just a few months after Lawrence was issued, Massachusetts would 
become the first state to formally extend marriage equality to same-sex 
couples.77  In its 2003 decision, Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,78 
the state’s highest court ruled that “barring an individual from the 
 
 70. Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)). 
 71. Id. at 578 (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.  
It ought not to remain binding precedent.  Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is 
overruled.”). 
 72. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  
 73. Id.; see also John G. Culhane, Marriage, Tort, and Private Ordering:  Rhetoric and 
Reality in LGBT Rights, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 437, 461 (2009) (“For all of its affirming 
language and sympathetic tone, though, Lawrence also reiterates—via needless dictum—that 
the case is not about marriage.”). 
 74. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 75. Id. at 604–05 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting id. at 567, 578 
(majority opinion)). 
 76. The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 226, 298 (2003). 
 77. See Douglas Nejaime, Before Marriage:  The Unexplored History of Nonmarital 
Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 166 (2014) (describing 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision as “the first state supreme court decision 
opening marriage to same-sex couples”). 
 78. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
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protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because that 
person would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts 
Constitution.”79  In so ruling, the court quoted Lawrence:  “Our obligation is 
to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”80  When it 
came to fashioning a remedy, the court did not strike down Massachusetts’s 
existing marriage laws but instead borrowed an approach from the highest 
court in Ontario, Canada, which held:  “[T]he appropriate remedy . . . .  is to 
declare invalid the existing definition of marriage to the extent that it refers 
to ‘one man and one woman,’ and to reformulate the definition of marriage 
as ‘the voluntary union for life of two persons to the exclusion of all 
others.’”81  Unlike Vermont, the Massachusetts court did not give the 
legislature the option of creating civil unions and, on May 17, 2004, 
Massachusetts began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.82 
Now that one state had officially extended the right to marry to same-sex 
couples, more states began to pass constitutional amendments aimed at 
insulating them from having to recognize same-sex marriages performed in 
other states.  That would not stop other states, however, from following 
Massachusetts’s lead.  In 2008, the highest courts in Connecticut83 and 
California84 likewise ruled that the state constitutions protected the right of 
same-sex couples to wed.  In so ruling, the Connecticut high court rejected 
civil unions as an option for curing the constitutional violation:  “Although 
marriage and civil unions do embody the same legal rights under our law, 
they are by no means equal.  The former is an institution of transcendent 
historical, cultural and social significance, whereas the latter is not.”85  The 
following year, the Supreme Court of Iowa would do the same, making it the 
first midwestern state to do so.86  Later that year, Vermont earned the 
 
 79. Id. at 969. 
 80. Id. at 948 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571). 
 81. Halpern v. Canada (Att’y Gen.) (2003), 65 O.R. 3d 161, paras. 144–48 (Can. Ont. 
C.A.) (emphasis added) (quoting Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee (1866) 1 LRP & D 130 at 
133 (Eng.)).  The Goodridge court “concur[red] with this remedy, which is entirely consonant 
with established principles of jurisprudence empowering a court to refine a common-law 
principle in light of evolving constitutional standards.” Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969. 
 82. See Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005) 
(“For the plaintiff couples in the Goodridge case, May 17 was the most important day of their 
lives . . . .  Others, too, were overwhelmed by the power of the government to acknowledge 
our humanity and our citizenship.”). 
 83. See generally Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). 
 84. See generally In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).  California would, 
however, cease issuing marriage licenses in November of that year after voters passed 
Proposition 8, which amended the California’s constitution to define marriage as involving 
one man and one woman. See Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for 
Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1297 (2010) (“The court, however, left intact the 
roughly eighteen thousand marriages that had occurred between the Marriage Cases decision 
and the passage of Proposition 8.”).  Same-sex marriage would not resume in California until 
2013, when the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 
693 (2013), which let stand the district court’s ruling that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional.  
Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 709 (holding that appellants lacked standing to appeal the district 
court’s opinion). 
 85. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 418. 
 86. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
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distinction of becoming the first state to legalize same-sex marriage not 
because the state’s highest court demanded it but through legislation—
legislation that would define marriage as “the legally recognized union of 
two people.”87  From 2009 to 2012, three other states and the District of 
Columbia would likewise pass legislation extending the right to marry to 
same-sex couples.88 
Although same-sex marriage had thus far involved questions of state law, 
the issue would take on federal constitutional dimensions in 2013 when the 
Supreme Court struck down section 3 of DOMA, which precluded same-sex 
spouses from qualifying for federal marriage benefits.89  The case was United 
States v. Windsor90 and involved a same-sex couple, Edith Windsor and Thea 
Spyer, who had been in a relationship since 1963.91  The two women, who 
lived in New York, where they registered as domestic partners in 1993, were 
married in Canada in 2007.92  In 2009, Spyer died, leaving her estate to 
Windsor.93  Had Windsor been male, she could have taken advantage of the 
marital exemption for federal estate tax, but because she was female, DOMA 
denied her that marital benefit, forcing her to pay over $300,000 in estate 
taxes.94  Thus, Windsor argued that DOMA was unconstitutional, and the 
Supreme Court agreed, ruling that section 3 was unconstitutional and 
characterizing it as violative of “basic due process and equal protection 
principles applicable to the Federal Government.”95  The Court observed:   
DOMA singles out a class of persons deemed by a State entitled to 
recognition and protection to enhance their own liberty.  It imposes a 
disability on the class by refusing to acknowledge a status the State finds 
to be dignified and proper.  DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed 
all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own 
children, that their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others.96 
 
 87. An Act Relating to Civil Marriages, No. 3, § 5, 2009 Vt. Acts & Resolves 33, 33 
(codified in relevant part at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2021)).  Previously, this provision had 
read:  “Marriage is the legally recognized union of one man and one woman.” See An Act 
Relating to Civil Unions, No. 91, § 25, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 72, 82; Calvin Massey, 
Public Opinion, Cultural Change, and Constitutional Adjudication, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1437, 
1448 n.47 (2010). 
 88. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 693 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting) 
(identifying Vermont, New Hampshire, New York, and Washington, D.C.). 
 89. Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996), invalidated by United States 
v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); see supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
 90. 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 91. Id. at 753. 
 92. Id.  Despite the fact they married in Canada, New York did recognize the validity of 
their marriage. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (“Because DOMA denies federal recognition to same-sex spouses, Windsor did 
not qualify for the marital exemption from the federal estate tax.”). 
 95. Id. at 769. 
 96. Id. at 775. 
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The Court concluded that “[b]y seeking to displace this protection and 
treating those persons as living in marriages less respected than others, the 
federal statute is in violation of the Fifth Amendment.”97 
On the heels of Windsor, the marriage equality movement gained 
considerable steam.  In his 2014 opinion in favor of marriage equality, Judge 
Richard Gergel of the District of South Carolina noted that “[i]n the 
approximately 17 months since the Windsor decision, federal courts in 
virtually every circuit and in every state with a same sex marriage ban have 
heard lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of such state law 
provisions.”98  A majority of those courts, including four federal circuit 
courts of appeals, would ultimately rule in favor of same-sex couples looking 
to marry.99  Notably, however, one appellate court—the Sixth Circuit—
reached the opposite conclusion and overturned lower court decisions in 
Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee.100  In late 2014, the Sixth Circuit 
issued its opinion, essentially holding that the voters and not the courts should 
decide the issue of same-sex marriage—an approach the dissent 
characterized as failing “to grapple with the relevant constitutional 
question.”101  That decision was DeBoer v. Snyder,102 but once the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari, it would be consolidated with another case and given 
a new name:  Obergefell v. Hodges. 
The Court would use Obergefell to finally address the larger question of 
whether a state may constitutionally prohibit same-sex marriage.103  
Although the Court had previously held that “the right to marry is protected 
by the Constitution,”104 the precedent cases in which that right had developed 
all involved laws that had clearly “presumed a relationship involving 
opposite-sex partners.”105  Nonetheless, in his majority opinion, Justice 
Kennedy held that an analysis of those opinions “compels the conclusion that 
same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry.”106  Specifically, the Court 
identified four essential “principles and traditions” related to marriage that 
justified its classification as a fundamental right—principles and traditions 
that, according to the Court, “apply with equal force to same-sex couples.”107 
 
 97. Id.  According to the Court, “the Fifth Amendment . . . withdraws from Government 
the power to degrade or demean in the way this law does.” Id. at 774. 
 98. Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 582 (D.S.C. 2014). 
 99. Carl Tobias, Marriage Equality Comes to the Fourth Circuit, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
2005, 2008 (2018) (“The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits affirmed district invalidations.”). 
 100. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 413 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom., Obergefell v. 
Hodges 576 U.S. 644 (2015); see also Watts, supra note 17, at S68–S69. 
 101. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 421 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). 
 102. 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom., Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644. 
 103. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 651. 
 104. Id. at 664. 
 105. Id. at 665.  The Court did acknowledge, however, Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 
(1972). See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text.  Obergefell, of course, overruled 
Baker. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 675. 
 106. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 665. 
 107. Id. 
2021] (IN)FORMAL MARRIAGE EQUALITY 1365 
First, going back to its decision in Loving, the Court noted that “the right 
to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual 
autonomy,”108 recognizing that “[t]here is dignity in the bond between two 
men or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such 
profound choices.”109  Second, according to the Court, marriage is a 
fundamental right because the institution “supports a two-person union 
unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals.”110  Third, 
the Court held that marriage “safeguards children and families and thus draws 
meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.”111  
Citing Windsor, where the Court noted how laws prohibiting same-sex 
marriage “harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples,”112 the 
Court explained that “[b]y giving recognition and legal structure to their 
parents’ relationship, marriage allows children ‘to understand the integrity 
and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their 
community and in their daily lives.’”113  Finally, the Court justified the 
fundamental nature of the right to marry, noting that marriage is “the 
foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither 
civilization nor progress.”114 
Having distilled the right to marry into those four components, each 
justifying its recognition as a fundamental right, the Court found no basis for 
excluding same-sex couples from that right: 
Same-sex couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage 
and seek fulfillment in its highest meaning.   
The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have 
seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of 
the fundamental right to marry is now manifest.  With that knowledge must 
come the recognition that laws excluding same-sex couples from the 
marriage right impose stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic 
charter.115 
Accordingly, the Court held that the Due Process Clause prohibits states from 
denying same-sex couples the ability to marry on terms equal to those of 
opposite-sex couples, paving the way for same-sex couples around the 
country to immediately begin exercising their constitutional right to marry—
something many of them had waited decades to do.116 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 666 (“The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons 
together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality.”). 
 110. Id.  As the Court explained, marriage “offers the hope of companionship and 
understanding and assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care for the 
other.” Id. at 667. 
 111. Id. (first citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); and then citing 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
 112. Id. at 668 (citing United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013)). 
 113. Id. at 668 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013)); id. 
(“Marriage also affords the permanency and stability important to children’s best interests.”). 
 114. Id. at 669 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)). 
 115. Id. at 670–71. 
 116. Id. at 671–72. 
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II.  OBERGEFELL AND PRE-EQUALITY “MARRIAGES” 
At its most basic level, Obergefell permitted same-sex couples to 
prospectively enter into formal marriages.  What it did not do was give legal 
effect to the relationships they had entered into years earlier when marriage 
was not an option.117  Thus, the question arises whether those couples are 
entitled to any credit for the time they spent waiting for marriage equality 
and, if so, how such credit is to be determined.  After all, Obergefell made 
clear that same-sex couples were not only entitled to the right to wed but were 
likewise entitled to do so “on the same terms and conditions” as opposite-sex 
couples.118  Just two years after Obergefell, the Court issued Pavan v. 
Smith,119 a per curiam order in which a majority reiterated that same 
understanding when it characterized Obergefell as being committed “to 
provide same-sex couples ‘the constellation of benefits that the States have 
linked to marriage.’”120 
As the remainder of this part makes clear, however, there are a number of 
marital benefits that would have accrued to those in same-sex relationships 
if not for the unconstitutional denial of their right to wed.  Thus, failure to 
count the years same-sex couples spent in an informal marriage-like state 
would undermine Obergefell’s promise of “liberty and equality under the 
Constitution.”121  After discussing several of the marital benefits that fall into 
this category, this part then looks to the disparate approaches states have 
taken when confronted with the issue of whether to “backdate” marriages for 
same-sex couples. 
A.  Benefits Conditioned on Length of Marriage 
This Article began by discussing Michael Ely’s pursuit of Social Security 
benefits, which is but one of the “constellation of benefits” tied to length of 
marriage.122  In their case, the Social Security Administration had refused to 
recognize Ely as a surviving spouse given that he was unable to satisfy the 
Social Security Act’s requirement that he be married to the insured for nine 
months.123  Other federal benefits have similar restrictions.  For instance, the 
statute governing pension benefits for surviving spouses of federal 
employees has the same nine-month marriage requirement.124  Additionally, 
the federal statute that deals with pension benefits for surviving spouses of 
military veterans withholds eligibility “unless such surviving spouse was 
 
 117. See Rhodes, supra note 26, at 433 (“The Supreme Court could have exceeded the 
presented issues and ordered remedial backdating in Obergefell as a constitutional 
minimum—but it did not.”). 
 118. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 676. 
 119. 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017). 
 120. Id. at 2077 (quoting Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 670). 
 121. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 674. 
 122. See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2077 (quoting Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 670); see also Ely 
Complaint, supra note 8. 
 123. And this is but one of the Social Security benefits tied to length of marriage.  For an 
excellent discussion of others, see Nicolas, supra note 26, at 408–12. 
 124. See 5 U.S.C. § 8341(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A). 
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married to such veteran . . . before the expiration of fifteen years after the 
termination of the period of service in which the injury or disease causing the 
death of the veteran was incurred or aggravated; or . . . for one year or 
more.”125  Beyond benefits related to surviving spouses, federal law likewise 
imposes length-of-marriage restrictions in the area of immigration law.  For 
instance, one can petition to have a spouse classified as an immediate relative 
only after “the alien has resided outside the United States for a 2-year period 
beginning after the date of the marriage.”126 
At the state level, there are additional benefits that are conditioned on 
being married for a certain amount of time.  In Arkansas, for instance, a 
surviving spouse’s ability to take an elective share is conditioned on having 
“been married to the decedent continuously for a period in excess of one (1) 
year.”127  Similarly, a number of other states calculate the amount of the 
elective share by looking at how long the parties were married.128  A number 
of states condition certain divorce protections on the length of the marriage.  
For instance, when it comes to the decision of whether to award alimony and 
in what amount, some states have statutes requiring courts to consider the 
length of the marriage.129  Indeed, in the absence of a statutory directive, 
several states have held that there is a rebuttable presumption of permanent 
alimony if the marriage was “long-term.”130  Many states also consider the 
length of the marriage when determining property distribution.131  A divorce 
statute in Washington, for instance, directs that “the court shall . . . make such 
disposition of the property and the liabilities of the parties . . . after 
 
 125. 38 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1)–(2); see also id. §§ 1304, 1541(f). 
 126. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(g) (emphasis added). 
 127. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-39-401(a) (2020).  The term “elective share” comes from 
“state law [that] gives surviving spouses the right to make claims against their deceased 
spouses’ estates, even if the deceased spouses explicitly disinherited them.” Laura A. 
Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage:  Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227, 1245. 
 128. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 524.2-202 (2020). 
 129. See, e.g., Lyudmila Workman, Alimony Demographics, 20 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
109, 110 (2011) (“Length of marriage is one significant factor in determining the distribution 
of alimony awards.”). 
 130. See id. (discussing a study that found “that women who had been housewives in 
marriages lasting 10 years or more were much more likely to be awarded support than those 
in marriages of less than five years, and that the likelihood of receiving alimony increased 
proportionately to the length of the underlying marriage”); see also Erez Aloni, The Puzzle of 
Family Law Pluralism, 39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 317, 341 (2016) (noting that “many states 
now restrict permanent alimony to long-term marriages”). 
 131. See, e.g., Impullitti v. Impullitti, 415 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); 
(“Factors to be considered in the division are the property’s source, contribution towards its 
acquisition, length of the marriage, and the needs and earning capacities of the parties.”); 
Swanson v. Swanson, 921 N.W.2d 666, 670 (N.D. 2019) (“A long-term marriage generally 
supports an equal property distribution.”); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81 (2020) (“In 
fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court . . . shall consider 
[among other things] the length of the marriage.”); IOWA CODE § 598.21 (2020) (“The court 
shall divide all property, except inherited property or gifts received or expected by one party, 
equitably between the parties after considering [among other things]:  a. The length of the 
marriage.”). 
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considering all relevant factors including . . . [t]he duration of the marriage 
or domestic partnership.”132 
Beyond absolute length of marriage, many marital benefits at the state 
level are conditioned on whether the parties were married during the 
occurrence of certain events.  One of the most notable examples relates to 
property distribution.  Upon divorce, the majority of states equitably divide 
a couple’s marital property between the two parties but not each spouse’s 
separate property, which remains with the spouse who owns it.133  
Determining whether particular property qualifies as marital or separate 
typically relates to when that property was acquired—if before marriage, it 
is separate; if during the marriage, it is marital.134  For an economically 
dependent spouse, this distinction can be crucial, especially if the most 
valuable property is ultimately declared the separate property of the other 
spouse. 
To illustrate, consider a same-sex couple who entered into a committed 
relationship in 2005.  The two would have married had they had the right to 
do so but instead were forced to wait until 2015, when Obergefell finally 
ushered in marriage equality.  The two immediately married but then 
divorced three years later.  In many states, any property the two had acquired 
between 2005 and 2015 would be considered separate and, thus, not subject 
to division upon divorce.  Had the couple been permitted to wed in 2005, 
however, that same property would have likely been classified as divisible, 
marital property.  Similar marital benefits that are conditioned on the parties 
being married at a certain point in time include the marital privilege, which 
protects only communications made between two people who were married 
at the time of the communication;135 the ability to bring a claim for loss of 
 
 132. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080(3) (2020). 
 133. See ANN LAQUER ESTIN, DOMESTIC RELATIONSHIPS:  A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 
713 (2019) (“Most states are ‘marital property’ states, which require the divorce court to 
classify the property owned by the spouses at the time of divorce as either marital or separate, 
and then authorize the court to divide all marital property.”).  Community property states 
follow a similar approach but label the property acquired during marriage as “community 
property,” a designation that influences the “management and use” of that property not only 
when the marriage ends but during the marriage as well. Id. at 714.  A minority of states follow 
the “hotchpot” approach, whereby all property is subject to division regardless of when it was 
acquired. Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?:  An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of 
Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 836 n.76 (2005) (noting that only fourteen 
states “permit[] the division of premarital assets”). 
 134. There are typically exceptions, however, for property acquired during marriage as a 
result of inheritance or gift. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-213 (2020) (“A spouse’s 
real and personal property that is owned by that spouse before marriage and that is acquired 
by that spouse during the marriage by gift, devise or descent, . . . is the separate property of 
that spouse.” (emphasis added)); see also Carla M. Roberts, Worthy of Rejection:  Copyright 
as Community Property, 100 YALE L.J. 1053, 1059–60 (1991) (“Separate property typically 
is anything an individual owned prior to entering a marriage, income received from separate 
property, and property received by descent, devise, or gift during the marriage.”). 
 135. See Steven A. Young, Note, Retroactive Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage for the 
Purposes of the Confidential Marital Communications Privilege, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
319, 330 (2016) (“[I]t is critically important that the privilege requires ‘spouses,’ meaning the 
two parties must be married at the time the communication was made.”). 
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consortium, which requires the claimant to have been married to the injured 
party at the time of the injury;136 and the marital presumption, which 
presumes the spouse of a mother is the child’s second parent but only if the 
two were married when she gave birth.137 
At the same time, one cannot lose sight of the marital benefits tied to the 
very fact of marriage and how the availability of those benefits has impacted 
same-sex relationships that predated marriage equality.  For instance, there 
are a number of individuals living today who never formalized their same-
sex relationships simply because their partners died before they were legally 
permitted to wed.  For those survivors, the timing of their partners’ deaths 
caused significant legal harm.  Consider, for instance, Helen Thornton and 
Margery Brown, who were in a committed relationship in Washington for 
twenty-seven years.138  The two women met in 1979, and their relationship 
lasted until 2006, when Brown died of cancer.139  Given that same-sex 
marriage was not permitted in Washington State until 2012, the two women 
were unable to marry.140  Accordingly, when Thornton filed for Social 
Security benefits as a surviving spouse, her application was denied.141 
In addition, there are a number of same-sex relationships that the parties 
dissolved prior to marriage equality.  The potential harm to individuals in 
those relationships stems from the fact that, had they been permitted to marry, 
those relationships might have been marital and thus could only have been 
dissolved in accordance with the protections afforded by the states’ divorce 
laws.  For example, in 2004, Kimberly Sutton proposed marriage to Charlene 
Ramey.142  The Oklahoma couple spent the next eight and a half years living 
together and holding themselves out as a committed couple.143  The two even 
agreed to become parents.144  Using artificial insemination, Kimberly 
became pregnant and gave birth to a son in 2005.145  Nonetheless, Kimberly 
acknowledged Charlene as the child’s other parent.146  In fact, Charlene 
served as primary caregiver to the child, who referred to Charlene as 
 
 136. See infra notes 156–64 and accompanying text. 
 137. See Dara E. Purvis, The Origin of Parental Rights:  Labor, Intent, and Fathers, 41 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 645, 662 (2014) (“Long before paternity tests were available, in other 
words, the marital presumption assumed that married women did not bear children fathered 
by men other than their husbands.”); see also infra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 138. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive & Other Relief at 2, Thornton v. Berryhill, No. 
18-1409, 2020 WL 5494891 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 11, 2020). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Ramey v. Sutton, 362 P.3d 217, 220 (Okla. 2015) (“Ramey . . . wore a diamond ring 
to reflect their mutual commitment.”). 
 143. Id. at 219. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id.  Although “[a] friend of the couple agreed to be the donor,” the court noted that 
“[t]he donor understood and agreed that Ramey and Sutton would co-parent and raise any 
child conceived as their own and that he did not have any obligations.” Id. at 219 n.4. 
 146. Id. at 219 (“Sutton prepared a baby book for their child identifying both Sutton and 
Ramey as parents.  Sutton gave a card to Ramey congratulating her on becoming a ‘mother’ 
to their son and that she would be a wonderful mom.”). 
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“mom.”147  Likewise, the trio held themselves out to friends and relatives as 
a family.148 
When the relationship between the two women ultimately ended, 
Kimberly argued that Charlene was not entitled to custody or visitation, given 
that she was not a biological parent and the two had never married.149  Had 
the two wed at any point prior to dissolving their relationship, there would 
have been no question that Charlene was a legal parent.150  Charlene did 
ultimately prevail, but it was not because the court was willing to consider 
the quality of the relationship during a time when marriage was an 
impossibility.  Instead, the court ruled that, “although the biological mother 
enjoys many rights as a parent, it does not include the right to erase a 
relationship that she voluntarily created and fostered with their child.”151 
Thus, for the LGBTQIA+ Americans who were lucky enough to have lived 
to see marriage equality become the law of the land, they still face 
discrimination when it comes to receiving “the same terms and conditions” 
as different-sex couples.152  Specifically, individuals today who were in 
same-sex relationships that would have been marriages had the law not 
prevented them from formalizing their unions are being denied a number of 
protective benefits.  Although these benefits are likewise denied to different-
sex couples whose relationships ended before they could marry or who spent 
years cohabitating prior to formal marriages, there is a key difference:  for 
same-sex couples, marriage was a legal impossibility. 
B.  State Responses 
The concept of formal marriage equality is still relatively new and, as such, 
there are a number of questions regarding the reach of Obergefell with which 
the law must still grapple.153  Justice Kennedy’s equal protection analysis, 
for instance, did little to illuminate the standard of review that applies to 
 
 147. Id.  The child would not refer to Kimberly as her mother “until the age of five or six.” 
Id. (“Even today, their child will sometimes refer to Sutton, the biological mom as Kimberly 
and not as ‘mom.’”). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7700-204 (2021) (stating that “[a] man is presumed to be the 
father of a child if . . . [h]e and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child 
is born during the marriage”).  Although the statute is written in gendered terms, the Supreme 
Court has ruled that a state cannot extend the marital presumption to different-sex marriages 
without also extending it to same-sex marriages. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 
(2017). 
 151. Ramey, 362 P.3d at 221.  In ruling for Ramey, however, the court did note that “[t]he 
couple’s failure to marry cannot now be used as a means to further deprive the nonbiological 
parent, who has acted in loco parentis, of a best interests of the child hearing.” Id. at 220–21. 
 152. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 676 (2015). 
 153. Craig Green, Turning the Kaleidoscope:  Toward a Theory of Interpreting Precedents, 
94 N.C. L. REV. 379, 467 (2016) (noting that Obergefell “resolved doctrinal debates over 
same-sex marriage, but . . . raised unanswered questions concerning LGBT discrimination, 
polygamy, and other forms of constitutional liberty”). 
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discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.154  What does seem clear, 
however, in the wake of both Obergefell and Pavan is that whatever marital 
benefits a state extends to different-sex couples, it must likewise extend to 
same-sex couples.  The question arises, however, as to how states are to 
apportion marital benefits to same-sex couples who were prohibited by law 
from marrying.  Since Obergefell, the issue has arisen in a variety of contexts 
and, not surprisingly, the states have taken a number of different approaches. 
Even before Obergefell, the Supreme Court of Connecticut became one of 
the earliest courts to rule that same-sex couples are entitled to marital benefits 
if—but for the prohibition against same-sex marriage—they would have wed 
at an earlier date.  In Mueller v. Tepler,155 Margaret Mueller and Charlotte 
Stacey were in a longtime relationship that began in 1985.156  In 2001, 
Margaret’s physician diagnosed and subsequently treated her for ovarian 
cancer when, in fact, she was suffering from cancer of the appendix.157  Left 
untreated, Margaret’s cancer progressed to the point where surgery was no 
longer an option, and she died in 2009.158  In 2006, however, she brought a 
medical malpractice claim, which included a claim by Charlotte for loss of 
consortium.159  The defendants moved to strike Charlotte’s claim on the basis 
that, at the time of the alleged negligence, she and Margaret were not married, 
as required by the state’s law regarding loss of consortium claims.160  
Although the two did enter into a civil union in 2005 pursuant to Connecticut 
law, the plaintiffs had alleged that the medical malpractice occurred before 
that date.161 
Nonetheless, the court ruled that the requirement that the plaintiff must 
have been married to the injured party at the time of the injury “only has 
logical force . . . if the couple was capable of entering into a ‘formal marriage 
relation’ prior to the injury.”162  Because that option was not available to 
Margaret and Charlotte, the court expanded the ability to bring a loss of 
consortium claim “to members of couples who were not married when the 
tortious conduct occurred, but who would have been married if the marriage 
 
 154. See, e.g., Peter Nicolas, Reconstruction, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 937, 985 (2020) 
(“[T]he Court appeared to apply something more rigorous than traditional rational basis 
review, [but] never articulated a standard of review.”). 
 155. 95 A.3d 1011 (Conn. 2014). 
 156. Id. at 1015. 
 157. Id. (noting that the doctor “either failed to review the pathology report or 
misinterpreted its findings”). 
 158. Id. (“Although the error was discovered in April, 2005, Mueller’s cancer had 
progressed to a stage where some of the tumors no longer could be removed surgically.”). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.; see also Gurliacci v. Mayer, 590 A.2d 914, 931–32 (Conn. 1991) (“[V]irtually all 
of the jurisdictions that have considered the question take the position that ‘[a]n action for loss 
of consortium cannot be maintained unless the plaintiff was married to the injured person at 
the time of the actionable conduct.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Briggs v. 
Butterfield Mem’l Hosp., 479 N.Y.S.2d 758, 758 (App. Div. 1984))). 
 161. Mueller, 95 A.3d at 1015.  The court did note, however, that the two were not 
permitted to enter into the civil union until a year after the doctor had stopped treating 
Margaret. Id. at 1015 n.4. 
 162. Id. at 1017 (quoting plaintiff’s objection to defendants’ motion to strike). 
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had not been barred by state law.”163  In light of that expansion, the court 
remanded the case to determine whether the women’s relationship met that 
test.164 
The following year, an Oregon court adopted a similar test.  There, Karah 
and Lorrena Madrone held a commitment ceremony in 2005.165  Two years 
later, the two women decided to have a child by artificial insemination and 
Lorrena agreed to carry the child.166  Afterwards, the two women both 
changed their last names to Madrone and registered as domestic partners 
pursuant to Oregon law.167  The relationship between the women 
“deteriorated” and in 2012, Karah filed for a dissolution of the domestic 
partnership.168  She also sought a declaration that she was the legal parent of 
the child born to Lorrena.169  Karah did so by relying on an Oregon statute 
that provided that a husband of a woman who conceives by artificial 
insemination is presumed (assuming he consented to the insemination) to be 
the legal father.170  Although Oregon courts had previously extended the 
statute’s protections to same-sex partners,171 Lorrena objected on the basis 
that the two women did not enter into a domestic partnership until after the 
child was born.172  The court rejected her argument, however, and held that 
“choice is the key to determining whether [the Oregon statute] applies to a 
particular same-sex couple.”173  The court further opined: 
Given that same-sex couples were until recently prohibited from choosing 
to be married, the test for whether a same-sex couple is similarly situated 
to the married opposite-sex couple contemplated in [the statute] cannot be 
whether the same-sex couple chose to be married or not.  Rather, the salient 
question is whether the same-sex partners would have chosen to marry 
before the child’s birth had they been permitted to.174 
For those reasons, the case was remanded to determine whether the “couple 
would have married had that choice been available.”175 
 
 163. Id. at 1023. 
 164. Id. at 1030–31. 
 165. In re Madrone, 350 P.3d 495, 497 (Or. Ct. App. 2015). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 498 n.1. 
 168. Id. at 497–98. 
 169. Id. at 498 (“Petitioner alleged that, at the time of R’s conception and birth, she was 
respondent’s ‘domestic and life partner,’ that she and respondent had planned the pregnancy 
with the intent to raise the child together, and that she had consented to the artificial 
insemination procedure.”). 
 170. Id. at 498 (noting the statute provides the same rights to the mother’s husband “as if 
the child had been naturally and legitimately conceived by the mother and the mother’s 
husband” (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 109.243 (2018))). 
 171. See Shineovich v. Kemp, 214 P.3d 29, 40 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (extending “the statute 
so that it applies when the same-sex partner of the biological mother consented to the artificial 
insemination”). 
 172. In re Madrone, 350 P.3d at 499 (quoting Lorrena’s argument that “the protections 
afforded in [the Oregon statute] apply to domestic partners, not simply people in a 
relationship”). 
 173. Id. at 501. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 502. 
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The Connecticut and Oregon cases both arose in states where same-sex 
couples, even before they obtained the right to marry, had the option of 
entering into civil unions or domestic partnerships.  Since Obergefell, many 
of those states have adopted legislation concerning how time spent in these 
“alternative species of quasi-marriage”176 will count toward the length of the 
marriage.  Specifically, as Professor Peter Nicolas explains, seven states that 
permitted same-sex couples to enter into domestic partnerships or civil 
unions pre-Obergefell have since “created a seamless mechanism for 
converting civil unions or domestic partnerships to marriages.”177  Of those, 
about half have legislated that the marriage began on the date the relationship 
was converted to a formal marriage, while the remainder set the date as the 
time the couple first entered into the domestic partnership or civil union.178  
Although the latter approach allows the same-sex couple to count more of 
their actual relationship toward the subsequent marriage, it still only applies 
to those portions that came after the couple entered into the domestic 
partnership or civil union—legal options that may not have been available 
until after the couple had already been in a relationship for many years. 
Nonetheless, such an approach is still superior to that being taken in states 
that fail to even offer civil unions or domestic partnerships.  In the few cases 
that have arisen in those states, courts have simply refused to grant marital 
benefits to same-sex couples whose relationships spanned time periods in 
which they were prohibited from marrying.  Consider, for instance, a 
Michigan case involving two women, Deanna and Johanna Mabry, who were 
in a relationship that began in 1995 and lasted until 2010.179  During that 
time, the two bought a house together and participated in a commitment 
ceremony, and Johanna even took Deanna’s last name.180  Most relevant to 
the subsequent litigation, however, was the fact that the relationship 
produced three children.181  Johanna was the biological mother, having 
conceived using an anonymous donor.182  Nonetheless, Deanna’s role in the 
children’s lives was “significant” in that she “provided [them] with health 
insurance, she was the sole financial provider for the family, and she 
provided care and guidance to the children.”183  In fact, Johanna’s will 
 
 176. Andersen v. King County, No. 04–2–04964–4, 2004 WL 1738447, at *12 (Wash. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 2004), rev’d, 158 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006). 
 177. Nicolas, supra note 26, at 405. 
 178. Id. at 405–06; Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 26.60.100(4) (2020) (“[T]he date of the 
original state registered domestic partnership is the legal date of the marriage.”), with 15 R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 15-3.1-13 (2020) (“For purposes of determining the legal rights and 
responsibilities involving [married] individuals who previously entered into a civil union in 
this state, . . . the date of the recording of the marriage certificate shall be the operative date 
by which legal rights and responsibilities are determined.”). 
 179. Mabry v. Mabry, 882 N.W.2d 539, 540 (Mich. 2016) (McCormack, J., dissenting). 
 180. Id. (observing that the two took additional steps, including “filing a declaration of 
domestic partnership, . . . entering a formal domestic-partnership agreement, . . . and entering 
into a marriage covenant in the form of a ketubah”). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. (noting that all three children “were biological children of the defendant but took 
the plaintiff’s last name and were parented by both the defendant and the plaintiff”). 
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provided that, “in the event of her death, [Deanna] would be the children’s 
legal guardian and conservator.”184 
However, when the parties ended their relationship and Deanna petitioned 
for custody, the Michigan court ruled that she lacked standing because she 
was never formally married to the children’s mother.185  Unlike the courts in 
Connecticut and Oregon,186 the Michigan court refused to even consider 
whether the couple would have married had they been permitted to do so.  A 
year earlier, a court in Florida, on very similar facts, reached the same 
conclusion.187  Thus, in comparison to states like Connecticut and Oregon, 
states that never adopted alternatives to marriage currently appear to be more 
hostile to backdating claims of those in same-sex relationships. 
There is, however, one exception—the handful of states that permit 
informal or common-law marriage.  A survey of decisions from those states 
reveals that some have been willing to offer relief by finding that the couple 
had effectuated a common-law marriage.  To illustrate, consider the South 
Carolina case of Debra Parks, who ended a forty-year relationship with her 
partner in 2017.188  During this time, the two had bought a house and “other 
property together, had joint bank accounts, used each other on tax documents, 
and lived together until 2016.”189  The couple resided in South Carolina, 
which did not permit same-sex marriage until 2014.190  South Carolina does, 
however, recognize common-law marriage.191  When Parks sued to have her 
relationship declared a common-law marriage, the judge agreed.192  In 
essence, the court ruled that not only had the two entered into a common-law 
marriage but that it had commenced when Parks divorced her husband in 
1987—twenty-seven years before South Carolina would begin allowing 
same-sex marriage.193  Other states that recognize common-law marriage 
have reached similar results when dealing with individuals whose same-sex 
partners died before they were able to legally wed.194 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 541 (“The order held that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring a custody 
action pursuant to the equitable-parent doctrine because that doctrine is only available to a 
parent who was married.”). 
 186. See supra notes 156–75 and accompanying text. 
 187. See generally Willis v. Mobley, 171 So. 3d 739 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015), No. 5D14–
3424, 2015 WL 4389054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 14, 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished table 
decision). 
 188. See Andrew Dys, Same-Sex Legal Groundbreaker:  Judge Says Rock Hill Couple 
Married in S.C. for Decades, HERALD (Mar. 23, 2017, 8:48 AM), 
https://www.heraldonline.com/news/local/article139540723.html [https://perma.cc/Z46Q-
QGZZ] (reporting the facts of York County Family Court case, Parks v. Lee, 2016-DR-451061 
(2016)). 
 189. Id.  According to Parks, “We were a family, even when society didn’t accept it.” Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id.  According to the judge, “Quoting William Shakespeare, ‘A rose by any other name 
would smell as sweet,’ . . . .  The law established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Obergefell . . . 
should be applied retroactively in South Carolina.” Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See Nicolas, supra note 26, at 416–18 (collecting cases); Young, supra note 135, at 
338–43 (collecting cases).  
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Because very few states permit common-law marriage, however, the vast 
majority of states have had to fashion new tests for dealing with same-sex 
relationships that predated marriage equality.  And, as detailed earlier, those 
states have done so with varying approaches and with divergent opinions as 
to what true marriage equality entails.  That itself is problematic, in light of 
the fact that the right to marry is a constitutionally protected right.195  As 
such, there necessarily must exist some standards to which all states must 
adhere.  Of course, family law is largely within the primary province of the 
states and, as such, it would be unreasonable to expect all states to have an 
identical response to this issue.196  In fact, as Professor Charles Rhodes has 
pointed out, “family law courts, as a rule, traditionally have broad judicial 
discretion in adjudicating disputes and fashioning just outcomes.”197  
Nonetheless, because “federal constitutional rights are understood to extend 
equally across the land,”198 there are limits to how divergent states can be 
when it comes to resolving the issue of backdating same-sex marriage.199 
Thus, a more consistent remedy is necessary if states are to redress the 
harms that many individuals from same-sex relationships continue to 
experience as a result of the unconstitutional laws that had long prevented 
them from marrying. 
III.  THE LAW OF INFORMAL FAMILY CREATION 
States that refuse to consider the pre-equality portion of a same-sex 
couples’ relationships are producing two separate but related harms.  First, 
they are shortchanging individuals in same-sex marriages who seek marital 
benefits tied to length of marriage.200  Second, these states completely deny 
all marital benefits to those who were in same-sex relationships that ended 
(either through dissolution or death) prior to the time marriage became a legal 
option.  Both harms run counter to the Court’s holding in Obergefell and thus 
a new remedy is required. 
 
 195. See Michael J. Higdon, Polygamous Marriage, Monogamous Divorce, 67 DUKE L.J. 
79, 96 (2017) (“[T]he Court has declared that, under the substantive component of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to marry is a fundamental right.”). 
 196. See Elizabeth G. Patterson, Unintended Consequences:  Why Congress Should Tread 
Lightly When Entering the Field of Family Law, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 397, 406 (2008) 
(“Leaving family law to the states, however, allows diversity to exist within the United States, 
and individuals whose values differ from those of the majority in one location have the 
alternative of emigrating to another, more compatible, community.”); Milton C. Regan Jr., 
Reason, Tradition, and Family Law:  A Comment on Social Constructionism, 79 VA. L. REV. 
1515, 1524 (1993) (“[A] cardinal tenet of United States jurisprudence is that family law is 
primarily the province of individual states—a principle that explicitly invites the codification 
of diverse particular judgments about how family life should be arranged.”). 
 197. Rhodes, supra note 26, at 432. 
 198. Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism:  State and Local Criminal Laws and 
the Applicability of Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 169 (2009). 
 199. Michael J. Higdon, Constitutional Parenthood, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1483, 1490 (2018) 
(“[L]ike all constitutional rights, [parenthood] must necessarily possess some core limits that 
bind the states.”). 
 200. See Nicolas, supra note 26, at 397 (“[M]any same-sex relationships appear artificially 
short in endurance when measured solely by reference to the couple’s civil marriage date.”). 
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In formulating an appropriate remedy, however, it is important to first 
recognize that states are not starting from a blank slate when it comes to 
awarding family-like benefits to individuals who lack formal family 
relationships.  Instead, the states already possess a number of equitable 
doctrines that operate in a variety of different contexts to do just that—
doctrines that can greatly assist the courts in crafting a new remedy to protect 
same-sex couples whose relationships predated marriage equality.  These 
existing remedies operate against a backdrop where, despite the robust legal 
protections that exist for American families, there is little consensus on the 
precise legal definition of “family.”201  When people talk of “starting a 
family,” one typically imagines marriage and the eventual addition of 
children, either through birth or adoption.  The reality, however, is much 
more complicated, and over the years, that complexity has only grown.202  
Couples may get married or they may not.  Perhaps the couple thought they 
were married when, in reality, the marriage was void for some reason.  The 
two may have children together or they may not.  Perhaps they end up raising 
children who only have a biological relationship with one of them.  Maybe 
the nonbiological parent adopts the new children but perhaps not.  Maybe 
they agree to take in a child from a friend or relative and, despite an intent to 
do so, never get around to formally adopting the child. 
Family law is no stranger to dealing with any of these scenarios, 
consistently drawing on its “built-in flexibility to adapt to changing 
times.”203  And, indeed, over the years, states have developed a number of 
doctrines that permit courts to extend familial rights even to those who failed 
to formally create legal family relationships.  What follows is a brief survey 
of five different examples that courts have relied on to fashion a new remedy 
for same-sex couples whose “marriages” predated the legal recognition of 
their right to form such unions.  In reviewing these existing doctrines, it is 
important to note how the courts resort to them primarily for reasons of 
equity, focusing on the need to protect parties from the harms they would 
otherwise suffer were the courts to rigidly insist on form over substance. 
 
 201. Kirsten Korn, Comment, The Struggle for the Child:  Preserving the Family in 
Adoption Disputes Between Biological Parents and Third Parties, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1279, 1291 
(1994) (“Although the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution protects various aspects 
of the family, as well as the parent-child relationship, determining what constitutes a ‘family’ 
and who may be considered ‘parents’ for purposes of such protection has proved difficult.”). 
 202. Michael J. Higdon, The Quasi-parent Conundrum, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 941, 948–49 
(2019) (discussing various social changes that have led to American families being “more 
heterogeneous than ever before”). 
 203. Supriya Kakkar, Note, Unauthorized Embryo Transfer at the University of California, 
Irvine Center for Reproductive Health, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1015, 1031 (1997); see also 
Bradley G. Silverman, Federal Questions and the Domestic-Relations Exception, 125 YALE 
L.J. 1364, 1392 (2016) (“Crafting a workable system of family law requires calibrating a 
‘complex level of benefits’ to which state law entitles those who occupy different familial 
roles.” (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Mae Kuykendall, David Upham & Michael Worley in 
Support of Neither Party & Urging Affirmance on Question 1, at 15, Obergefell v. Hodges, 
576 U.S. 644 (2015) (No. 14-556))). 
2021] (IN)FORMAL MARRIAGE EQUALITY 1377 
A.  Informal Marriage 
Common-law marriage provides likely the most obvious example of 
legally recognized family relationships that arise through informal means.  
Also referred to as informal marriage, common-law marriage “is formed by 
the conduct, statements, and intent of the parties to the marriage without 
official involvement or formalities.”204  However, unlike the other equitable 
remedies discussed below, where parties can claim some of the rights 
associated with either marriage or parentage, common-law marriage results 
in a legal union that carries with it the same rights and obligations of formal 
marriage.205  As Judge Richard Posner explained in a 2000 opinion from the 
Seventh Circuit:  “The purpose of common law marriage is not to create a 
second-class sort of marriage, but rather to repair unintended deficiencies in 
the ceremony . . . .  [and thus] a common law spouse has the same rights as 
any other spouse.”206 
Despite the implications of its name, common-law marriage is largely an 
American invention.207  An 1809 case out of New York is commonly credited 
as the first to recognize the legality of informal marriage208 and the facts of 
that case help explain why states would embrace having this alternative path 
to legal marriage.  In Fenton v. Reed,209 Mrs. William Reed claimed a 
widow’s pension from a local provident society after the 1806 death of her 
husband.210  The society refused, however, on the basis that her marriage to 
William was invalid.211  After all, William was not her first husband.212  
Instead, she had previously wed a man named John Guest, who left her in 
1785 and traveled to “foreign parts.”213  When he did not return, she married 
Reed in 1792, believing her first husband to be dead.214  Guest was not dead, 
however, and returned to New York later that year, where he lived until his 
death in 1800.215 
 
 204. Rhodes, supra note 26, at 437. 
 205. See Peter Nicolas, Common Law Same-Sex Marriage, 43 CONN. L. REV. 931, 934 
(2011) (“When entered into, a common law marriage provides the same rights, privileges, and 
responsibilities as a ceremonial marriage, and is as durable as a ceremonial marriage, requiring 
divorce proceedings to terminate the relationship.”). 
 206. Barron v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 984, 985–86 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). 
 207. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 202 (2d ed. 1985) 
(“Probably there was no such institution [as common-law marriage] in England.”); Adair 
Dyer, The Internationalization of Family Law, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 625, 626 (1997) (noting 
that “the informal contractual status known as ‘common law marriage’ may have been an 
American innovation”). 
 208. See Charles P. Kindregan Jr., Same-Sex Marriage:  The Cultural Wars and the Lessons 
of Legal History, 38 FAM. L.Q. 427, 434 n.45 (2004) (“Informal marriage appears to have first 
been recognized by the New York court in Fenton v. Reed.”). 
 209. 4 Johns. 52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (per curiam). 
 210. Id. at 52–53. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 52. 
 214. Id. (“[I]t was reported, and generally believed, that [Guest] had died in foreign parts.”). 
 215. Id. 
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During this time, Guest “did not object to the connection between the 
plaintiff and Reed, and said that he had no claim upon her, and never 
interfered to disturb the harmony between them.”216  Nonetheless, given that 
she never divorced her first husband and he was still living when she married 
Reed, the society argued that her second marriage was void.217  Had she 
attempted to marry Reed again following Guest’s death, the marriage would 
have been valid, but she did not resolemnize her relationship with Reed.218  
The court, however, held that it was not necessary to prove that the marriage 
had been solemnized, holding instead that “[a] marriage may be proved . . . 
from cohabitation, reputation, acknowledgment of the parties, reception in 
the family, and other circumstances from which a marriage may be 
inferred.”219  Turning to the facts of the case, the court found that 
circumstances were such that, although her attempt to formally marry Reed 
was invalid given her existing marriage to Guest, she subsequently 
effectuated a common-law marriage with Reed after her first husband died:  
“The parties cohabited together as husband and wife, and under the 
reputation and understanding that they were such, from 1800 [when Guest 
died] to 1806, when Reed died.”220 
Other states would soon embrace the doctrine and its ability to protect the 
interests of those in economically dependent relationships.221  By the end of 
the nineteenth century, common-law marriage would become the law in a 
majority of the states.222  It proved popular for a number of reasons, including 
how well suited it was to frontier conditions where finding someone to 
perform a formal wedding might be difficult,223 how it provided individuals 
with greater autonomy and freedom from the state,224 how it helped 
legitimize children,225 and how it provided for unsuspecting women who 
 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 53.  In part, the court agreed:  “The marriage of the plaintiff below with William 
Reed during the life-time of her husband John Guest, was null and void.” Id. 
 218. Id. at 52 (“[N]o solemnization of marriage was proved to have taken place between 
the plaintiff and Reed, subsequent to the death of Guest.”). 
 219. Id. at 54 (“No formal solemnization of marriage was requisite.  A contract of marriage 
made per verba de presenti amounts to an actual marriage.”). 
 220. Id. 
 221. See Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes:  A Story of Compromise and 
Demoralization, Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 
45, 65–66 (1981) (“The idea that marriage could be validated by the mere consent of the 
spouses gained strength from cases that . . . recognized informal or ‘common law’ marriages 
and appeared in community property as well as in common law states.”). 
 222. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law 
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 715 (1996) (noting that the doctrine was recognized by “a 
majority of the states in 1920 and even more in the nineteenth century”). 
 223. See Perry Dane, A Holy Secular Institution, 58 EMORY L.J. 1123, 1147 (2009) 
(identifying “the difficulty of requiring resort to either a governmental or religious official in 
a dispersed frontier society” as one of the reasons states embraced common-law marriage). 
 224. See Nicolas, supra note 205, at 939 (“One oft-cited rationale [for common-law 
marriage] is a libertarian concept of autonomy and independence, the idea that marriage is a 
natural right and that individuals should be free to enter into marriages without the need to 
invoke the power of the state.”). 
 225. See Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders:  Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal 
Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134, 2166 (2014) (“Judges and 
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relied to their detriment on the existence of a valid marriage.226  In 1877, the 
Supreme Court seemingly gave its blessing to the idea of marriage by 
informal means when it held that, unless a state explicitly required formal 
marriage, marriage laws that required a license and a ceremony were “merely 
directory.”227 
As the United States entered into the twentieth century, however, 
common-law marriage began to lose favor rather rapidly.228  The various 
reasons for that decline have been well-documented elsewhere and thus do 
not require expansive discussion here, but in the words of Professor Cynthia 
Grant Bowman, they essentially boil down to “urbanization, 
industrialization, concerns about fraud, the ideology of the family, racism, 
and eugenics.”229  Currently, only eight states and the District of Columbia 
allow their citizens to effectuate marriage through informal means.230  Even 
those states, however, have heightened proof requirements to establish a 
common-law marriage,231 the most central being that the two parties show 
“an express mutual agreement, which must be in words of the present 
tense.”232  Recognizing that, in the absence of a formal ceremony, it might 
be difficult to prove the existence of such an agreement, many states permit 
parties to prove the agreement by relying on evidence of cohabitation and 
having a reputation in the community as being married.233  Other states 
 
lawyers acknowledged that a primary purpose of common law marriage was to ensure that 
children born of such a union were legitimate.”). 
 226. See Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior:  A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 957, 964 (2000) (“As common law marriage triumphed as a dominant legal 
rule over the course of the nineteenth century, it took as its premise that the law should protect 
innocent women from the whims and contrivances of irresponsible or rakish men.”). 
 227. Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 79 (1877). 
 228. See Ashley Hedgecock, Untying the Knot:  The Propriety of South Carolina’s 
Recognition of Common Law Marriage, 58 S.C. L. REV. 555, 562 (2007) (“Beginning in the 
late nineteenth century, many jurisdictions that previously recognized common law marriage 
began to abolish the doctrine.”). 
 229. Grant Bowman, supra note 222, at 732. 
 230. See Common Law Marriage by State, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 11, 
2020), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/common-law-marriage.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/LH8B-UBPW] (listing states); Common Law Marriage Is Alive and Well in the 
District of Columbia, JOSEPH, GREENWALD & LAAKE, PA (Aug. 2, 2018), 
https://www.jgllaw.com/blog/common-law-marriage-alive-well-district-columbia 
[https://perma.cc/ZA6R-96AT].  However, the Supreme Court of South Carolina recently 
ruled that, going forward, it will no longer allow its citizens to enter into common-law 
marriages, although it will continue to honor those that couples effectuated in the past. See 
generally Stone v. Thompson, 833 S.E.2d 266 (S.C. 2019). 
 231. See Michael J. Higdon, Fatherhood by Conscription:  Nonconsensual Insemination 
and the Duty of Child Support, 46 GA. L. REV. 407, 453 (2012) (“[C]ourts in those states 
recognizing common law marriage have noted that such claims are a ‘fruitful source of perjury 
and fraud’ and, as such, have placed a heavy burden on the party claiming common law 
marriage.” (quoting Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016, 1019 (Pa. 1998))). 
 232. Cerovic v. Stojkov, 134 A.3d 766, 777 (D.C. 2016). 
 233. See Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a 
Shared Moral Life, 75 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1842–43 (1987) (“Although the doctrine of common 
law marriage purportedly depends on the existence of an agreement to be married, normally 
an agreement is inferred by courts when a couple engages in cohabitation and acquires a 
reputation as husband and wife.”). 
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explicitly require the parties to prove cohabitation and reputation along with 
the existence of the agreement to enter into a common-law marriage.234  
States also require that the parties had the capacity to wed one another.235 
Although most states do not permit people within the state to effectuate a 
common-law marriage, under full faith and credit, all states recognize a 
common-law marriage validly effectuated in a state that does permit such 
unions.236  States do so pursuant to the lex loci rule by which “courts ‘will 
give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not 
as a matter of obligation but out of deference and respect.’”237  Thus, even 
states that do not permit common-law marriage can nonetheless use the 
doctrine to extend family law protections to citizens who spent time in a state 
that does permit informal marriage.  Many states have done just that, often 
by liberally construing the common-law marriage requirements of a sister 
state.238  In reviewing such cases, it is clear that courts do so to protect 
economically dependent “spouses” from the harms that would result from a 
finding that there was never a valid marriage. 
The classic example is Renshaw v. Heckler,239 a 1986 case out of the 
Second Circuit.  There, Edith Renshaw claimed to be the common-law wife 
of Albert Renshaw for purposes of securing Social Security benefits 
following Albert’s death.240  The couple was never formally married but had 
been living as though they were for over twenty years.241  They exchanged 
rings, celebrated their anniversary every year, and represented themselves as 
 
 234. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 MO. L. REV. 21, 
74 n.132 (1994) (“Most jurisdictions also require cohabitation, or actually and openly living 
together as husband and wife . . . .  Some jurisdictions further require that the parties hold 
themselves out to the world as husband and wife, and acquire a reputation as a married 
couple.” (alteration in original) (quoting Sol Lovas, When Is a Family Not a Family?:  
Inheritance and the Taxation of Inheritance Within the Nontraditional Family, 24 IDAHO L. 
REV. 353, 361 (1987))). 
 235. See Strasser, supra note 26, at 414 (“A couple barred by law from celebrating a 
ceremonial marriage will also be barred from contracting a common law marriage.”).  In terms 
of how that term is defined, Peter Nicolas explains that capacity “is interpreted to refer to 
minimum age and mental capacity” but also “encompasses any potential legal impediment to 
marrying, such as whether the parties are already married to other people, whether the 
marriage would be incestuous, or whether the parties to the relationship are of the same sex.” 
Nicolas, supra note 26, at 418 n.136. 
 236. See Lisa Milot, Restitching the American Marital Quilt:  Untangling Marriage from 
the Nuclear Family, 87 VA. L. REV. 701, 707–08 (2001) (“[B]ecause of the full faith and credit 
afforded a valid marriage in one state by other states, though, all states recognize the legal 
legitimacy of a common-law marriage contracted in another jurisdiction.”). 
 237. Port v. Cowan, 44 A.3d 970, 975 (Md. 2012) (quoting Wash. Suburban Sanitary 
Comm’n v. CAE-Link Corp., 622 A.2d 745, 757 (Md. 1993)). 
 238. See Adam Candeub & Mae Kuykendall, Modernizing Marriage, 44 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 735, 759 (2011) (“[C]ourts in states that do not recognize common law marriage 
sometimes stretch doctrine to recognize common law marriages of couples who reside 
there.”). 
 239. 787 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 240. Id. at 51. 
 241. Id. 
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married to those around them.242  The two even had a child together.243  The 
problem, however, was that they resided in New York, which no longer 
permitted common-law marriage.244 
Nonetheless, the court found that the two had effectuated a common-law 
marriage.245  It did so by relying on the fact that, for seven years in a row, 
the two took an annual road trip to Virginia and North Carolina246—two 
states that likewise do not permit common-law marriage.  Pennsylvania, 
however, did allow informal marriage and that fact proved relevant because 
the couple spent a single night in Pennsylvania during each of these trips.247  
Like other common-law states, Pennsylvania looked to cohabitation and 
reputation when determining whether a couple had effectuated a common-
law marriage.248  The Renshaws had clearly satisfied those elements over the 
course of their long-term relationship, but the question was whether they had 
done so while in Pennsylvania.249  Despite noting that Pennsylvania places a 
“heavy burden”250 on those seeking to establish a common-law marriage, the 
court nonetheless found that Edith had met that standard: 
The Renshaws’ stays in Pennsylvania were admittedly short; but they 
cohabitated during the entire time that they were there.  While the evidence 
of reputation is not extensive, they held themselves out as husband and wife 
to every individual they knew that they saw in Pennsylvania—his mother, 
her brother, and their daughter.  Moreover, Mrs. Renshaw testified that 
when Mr. Renshaw made reservations over the phone, he indicated on at 
least one occasion that the reservations were for himself, his wife, and their 
daughter.251 
Although the court stated that, “[i]n different circumstances, such facts alone 
might not prove sufficient,”252 it nonetheless held that “the Renshaws’ 
conduct while in Pennsylvania and elsewhere is . . . sufficient to . . . conclude 
 
 242. Id.  Additionally, she took his last name and “the couple filed joint tax returns as 
husband and wife, and Mr. Renshaw listed Mrs. Renshaw as his wife and beneficiary on his 
life insurance policy.” Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 52. 
 245. Id. at 53–54. 
 246. Id. at 51–52. 
 247. Id. at 52. 
 248. Id. (“Generally, a common-law marriage may be created by uttering words in the 
present tense with the intent to establish a marital relationship; but where no such utterance is 
proved, Pennsylvania law also permits a finding of marriage based on reputation and 
cohabitation when established by satisfactory proof.” (citation omitted) (first citing 
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 398 A.2d 978, 980 (Pa. 1979); and then citing In re Estate of 
Wagner, 159 A.2d 495, 498 (Pa. 1960))). 
 249. Id.  It was on this basis that the lower court had ruled against Mrs. Renshaw finding 
that “at best only 16 days out of Mr. Renshaw’s lifetime were spent in Pennsylvania [and] the 
overwhelming bulk of the supporting evidence rests on actions taken outside of Pennsylvania 
in non-common law states.” Id. at 53 (quoting Magistrate’s Decision & Order at 9, Renshaw, 
787 F.2d 50 (No. 85-6272)). 
 250. Id. at 52. 
 251. Id. at 53. 
 252. Id. 
1382 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
that the Renshaws entered into a valid common-law marriage under 
Pennsylvania law.”253 
Renshaw is but one example where a court has held that a valid common-
law marriage arose after only a few days in a common-law marriage state.254  
Although the reasoning in these cases appears to be a bit of a stretch,255 the 
states are clearly motivated to protect the economic interests of vulnerable 
citizens.256 
B.  Invalid Marriage 
Whereas common-law marriage allows parties to effectuate a marriage 
through informal means, other doctrines in the law allow a party to collect 
marital benefits from a formal marriage that was nonetheless invalid.  
Collectively, these doctrines are often referred to as the marriage validation 
principle, which courts use to try and find a valid marriage even in the face 
of facts that cast enormous doubt on that conclusion.257  The courts take this 
approach in light of the harms that could befall an economically dependent 
“spouse” who ultimately discovers that her marriage is invalid, thus 
depriving her of the benefits and protections to which she thought she was 
entitled.258  Two notable examples of ways in which courts attempt to 
validate questionable marriages are the doctrines of marriage by estoppel and 
putative marriage. 
Marriage by estoppel prohibits a party from using an invalid divorce to 
void a subsequent marriage.  However, the doctrine “is unlike classic 
equitable estoppel in that it does not focus solely on whether one party has 
made a misrepresentation on which the other has reasonably relied.”259  
Instead, “[t]he focus is broader and requires a consideration of all of the 
circumstances surrounding not only the procurement of the divorce but also 
 
 253. Id. at 54. 
 254. See, e.g., Blaw-Knox Constr. Equip. Co. v. Morris, 596 A.2d 679, 687 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1991) (holding that a Maryland couple effectuated a common-law marriage after 
spending two nights at a Pennsylvania hotel to attend a funeral); In re Coney v. R.S.R. Corp., 
563 N.Y.S.2d 211, 212 (App. Div. 1990) (holding that a couple effectuated a common-law 
marriage after spending three days visiting family in Georgia). 
 255. See Candeub & Kuykendall, supra note 238, at 759 (noting that “courts in states that 
do not recognize common law marriage sometimes stretch doctrine to recognize common law 
marriages of couples who reside there”). 
 256. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and Form:  
Towards a Differentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419, 453 
(2013) (pointing out that, because “traditional common law marriage is not likely to make a 
modern comeback . . . alternative constructs and regulations are used to protect vulnerable 
parties in long-term cohabitant relationships”). 
 257. See ESTIN, supra note 133, at 98 (“[T]he marriage validation principle . . . seeks to 
uphold marriages whenever possible.”). 
 258. See Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family:  A Critique of the American Law 
Institute’s “Domestic Partners” Proposal, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1189, 1198 (“The goal of 
protecting the financial interests or financial equity of individuals who enter into such 
relationships is similar to the policy underlying common law marriage, putative spouse, and 
equitable doctrines.”). 
 259. Lowenschuss v. Lowenschuss, 579 A.2d 377, 381 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
2021] (IN)FORMAL MARRIAGE EQUALITY 1383 
the conduct of the parties thereafter and the effect of a declaration of the 
invalidity of the divorce on others.”260  As such, “[i]t is sufficient, in many 
cases, that a court find only that it would be unfair to let a party take 
advantage of the legal invalidity of a divorce decree and the invalidity of the 
subsequent marriage.”261 
Consider the case of Lowenschuss v. Lowenschuss,262 where Pennsylvania 
resident Beverly Lowenschuss divorced her first husband in 1964 after 
traveling to Alabama.263  However, because she failed to establish residency 
in Alabama, her divorce was invalid.264  Not realizing her failure, Beverly 
returned to Pennsylvania, where she met and married Fred Lowenschuss.265  
The couple eventually had four children together.266  Although Fred testified 
that he learned of Beverly’s defective divorce in 1974, he nonetheless 
remained in the relationship as though nothing had changed.267  In 1981, 
Beverly filed for divorce.268  In response, Fred argued that, because she had 
never legally divorced her first husband, he and Beverly were never legally 
married.269  The court, however, held that Fred was estopped from raising 
the circumstances of Beverly’s previous divorce.270 
Even though Fred was not a party to her prior divorce proceedings, the 
court ruled that, in light of his conduct, it would be inequitable for him to 
raise that defense at such a late date.271  “[B]oth parties relied in good faith 
on the Alabama divorce in marrying each other in 1965 and continued to rely 
on that divorce at minimum until 1974. . . .  Husband conducted himself as a 
married man for nine years before 1974 and after 1974 he continued to live 
as he had before.”272  Ultimately, the court found that 
[n]o social purpose will be served by a decision that this marriage simply 
does not exist and that wife is still the legal wife of her first husband and 
that her four children were born of an illicit relationship.  To hold that 
 
 260. Id. 
 261. JOHN DEWITT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 42–43 (4th ed. 2013). 
 262. 579 A.2d 377 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
 263. Id. at 378.  Around this time, Alabama was a popular destination for those seeking a 
relatively easy and quick divorce. See Migratory Divorce:  The Alabama Experience, 75 
HARV. L. REV. 568, 569 (1962). 
 264. Lowenschuss, 579 A.2d at 378 (“Wife spent at most two days in Alabama and does 
not dispute the fact that she has never been a bona fide resident of Alabama.”). 
 265. Id.  Fred was an attorney and he “knew that wife was divorced, but denies knowing 
any of the details concerning how the divorce was procured.” Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id.  He learned of the divorce that year after he commenced a divorce action, which 
he subsequently withdrew. Id. 
 268. Id. at 377. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. at 386. 
 271. Id. (“Such a decision would contravene the strongly entrenched policy of this 
Commonwealth favoring preservation of the family unit.”). 
 272. Id. at 385. 
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husband may now raise this challenge simply in order to avoid the financial 
obligations of his marriage would be grossly inequitable.273 
To justify its ruling, the court reiterated the important and protective 
functions of both marriage and divorce, writing that “a decision which would 
allow husband to avoid his marital obligations at this late juncture would be 
completely inconsistent with the Commonwealth’s contemporary attitude 
toward divorce, which is grounded in the application of equitable principles 
to achieve economic justice and overall fairness between the parties.”274  As 
the court’s opinion makes clear, Fred was estopped largely because he 
continued in the marriage long after he learned of the faulty divorce.  Had he 
sought to invalidate the marriage shortly after learning the truth, he would 
have had a stronger argument.  However, Beverly might have still had some 
recourse as a putative spouse. 
Putative marriage is another marriage validation principle, and it allows 
courts to extend the civil effects of marriage to one who in good faith entered 
into a marriage that was nonetheless invalid.275  In other words, “[a] putative 
marriage . . . is a marriage which is in reality null, but which allows the civil 
effects of a valid marriage to flow to the party or parties who contracted it in 
good faith.”276  The only requirements parties must meet to avail themselves 
of this protection are to have had a ceremonial marriage and to have entered 
it with a good faith belief that the marriage was valid277—good faith being 
defined as “an honest and reasonable belief that there exists no legal 
impediment to the marriage.”278 
Although putative marriage does not equal legal marriage,279 the doctrine 
is nonetheless intended to promote equity and to protect innocent spouses—
for example, individuals who innocently but erroneously believed that they 
had obtained a valid divorce prior to remarrying.  As one court explained, 
“[a] marriage contracted when one spouse is a party to a previously 
 
 273. Id. at 386 (“Therefore, we hold that principles of estoppel based on well-established 
social policies favoring preservation of the family and economic justice require us to estop 
husband from asserting the invalidity of wife’s Alabama divorce.”). 
 274. Id. 
 275. See Christopher L. Blakesley, The Putative Marriage Doctrine, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1, 6 
(1985). 
 276. Id. 
 277. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Revision of the Law of Marriage:  One Baby Step Forward, 
48 LA. L. REV. 1131, 1150 (1988) (“A prerequisite to the application of the putative marriage 
doctrine is contracting the marriage in good faith.  The word contracting suggests a ceremony, 
which would mean that a marriage that is absolutely null because of no ceremony would never 
produce civil effects.”). 
 278. Casey E. Faucon, “Living Separate and Apart”:  Solving the Problem of Putative 
Community Property in Louisiana, 85 TUL. L. REV. 771, 774 n.11 (2011); see also Succession 
of Marinoni, 164 So. 797, 804 (La. 1935) (defining good faith as “ignoran[ce] of the cause 
which prevents the formation of the marriage or the defects in its celebration which caused its 
nullity” (emphases omitted)). 
 279. See Lee v. Hunt, 431 F. Supp. 371, 376 (W.D. La. 1977) (“[A] ‘putative spouse’ is not 
a spouse and has no personal status.  Instead, a ‘putative marriage’ merely creates the 
responsibilities that one spouse owes the other because one spouse is guilty of a fault and the 
other innocently believes the marriage is genuine.”). 
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undissolved marriage is absolutely null; however, equity demands that 
innocent persons not be injured through an innocent relationship.”280  As 
Professor Christopher Blakesley points out, the primary motivation behind 
this doctrine is the desire to ensure fairness:  “The putative marriage doctrine 
is a device developed to ameliorate or correct the injustice which would occur 
if civil effects were not allowed to flow to a party to a null marriage who 
believes in good faith that he or she is validly married.”281 
To illustrate, consider the 2004 Nevada case of Williams v. Williams.282  
There, Richard and Marcie Williams were married in 1973 and lived together 
as husband and wife for the next twenty-seven years, at which time Richard 
learned that Marcie had never divorced her first husband.283  As a result, 
Richard filed an annulment action to have his marriage to Marcie declared 
void.284  The Supreme Court of Nevada used this opportunity to adopt the 
putative spouse doctrine to ensure “[f]airness and equity.”285  The court ruled 
that a putative marriage existed despite Richard’s argument that Marcie had 
not entered into their marriage in good faith.286  Specifically, Marcie testified 
“that in 1971, she ran into [her first husband] at a Reno bus station, where he 
specifically told her that they were divorced and he was living with another 
woman.”287  Richard argued that such reliance was unreasonable given that 
she had never been served with divorce papers and, at the very least, she had 
had a duty to inquire further into the existence of the divorce before marrying 
again.288  The court, however, rejected Richard’s arguments and held that 
“[t]he record reflects no reason for Marcie to have disbelieved him and, thus, 
no reason to have investigated the truth of his representations.”289 
In ruling as it did, the court took extensive note of Marcie’s financial 
circumstances: 
During the 27 years that the parties believed themselves to be married, 
Marcie was a homemaker and a mother.  From 1981 to 1999, Marcie was a 
licensed child-care provider for six children.  During that time, she earned 
$460 a week.  At trial, Marcie had a certificate of General Educational 
Development (G.E.D.) and earned $8.50 an hour at a retirement home.  She 
was 63 years old and lived with her daughter because she could not afford 
to live on her own.290 
 
 280. Lee v. Hunt, 483 F. Supp. 826, 842 (W.D. La. 1978), aff’d 631 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 
1980). 
 281. Blakesley, supra note 275, at 6. 
 282. 97 P.3d 1124 (Nev. 2004) (per curiam). 
 283. Id. at 1126. 
 284. Id. (“Marcie answered and counterclaimed for one-half of the property and spousal 
support as a putative spouse.”). 
 285. Id. at 1128. 
 286. Id. at 1127–29. 
 287. Id. at 1127 (“According to Marcie, she discovered she was still married to [her first 
husband] during the course of the annulment proceedings with Richard.”). 
 288. Id. at 1129. 
 289. Id.  Relatedly, the court also ruled that “[g]ood faith is presumed.  The party asserting 
lack of good faith has the burden of proving bad faith.” Id. at 1128. 
 290. Id. at 1127. 
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Implicit in this recitation is the court’s awareness of the degree to which 
Marcie would be harmed if forced to walk away from a twenty-seven-year 
relationship, which she believed was a marriage, with no rights to the 
“marital” property.  By finding that Marcie was—if not a legal spouse—a 
putative spouse, the property acquired during her marriage to Richard was 
labeled quasi-community property and divided equally between them.291 
C.  No Marriage 
Some states have even used their equitable powers to award marital 
benefits to individuals who never married but merely cohabitated in a 
domestic relationship.  Historically, the states did very little to protect the 
economic interests of those who enter into such relationships.292  And they 
did so purposefully, reasoning that any benefits afforded cohabitating 
couples might discourage formal marriage.293  With its landmark decision in 
Marvin v. Marvin,294 however, California began to change all that, holding 
that express contracts between cohabitants regarding property distribution 
were enforceable so long as they were not conditioned “upon the immoral 
and illicit consideration of meretricious sexual services.”295  In the absence 
of an express agreement, the Supreme Court of California held that recovery 
was likewise permitted on the basis of an implied contract “or equitable 
remedies such as constructive or resulting trusts.”296 
By opening the door to legal protections for cohabitants, Marvin was 
heavily criticized by those who feared that such an approach would “weaken 
marriage as the foundation of our family-based society.”297  However, in the 
more than forty years that have elapsed since Marvin, most agree that overall 
it had little impact.298  First, a handful of states continue in their refusal to 
enforce any cohabitation agreements.299  Second, even among those that do, 
 
 291. Id. at 1129–30. 
 292. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Forces Shaping the Law of Cohabitation for Opposite Sex 
Couples, 7 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 135, 159 (2005) (“[H]istorically, the cohabiting relationship was 
treated as a ‘negative status’ in the law.  That is, unmarried cohabitants experienced significant 
legal burdens by virtue of their relationship alone.”). 
 293. See Emily Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice:  Restitution Between Cohabitants, 77 
U. COLO. L. REV. 711, 722 (2006) (noting the concern that providing “legal equivalence 
between marriage and cohabitation will devalue and discourage marriage”). 
 294. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 
 295. Id. at 112. 
 296. Id. at 110. 
 297. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (Ill. 1979).  The court held that cohabitation 
agreements “are unenforceable for the reason that they contravene the public policy [of the 
state] . . . disfavoring the grant of mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly 
unmarried cohabitants.” Id. at 1211. 
 298. As Professor Deborah Rhode has pointed out, “[w]hat little empirical evidence is 
available suggests that cohabitation generally is not the result of a conscious choice.  Rather, 
individuals tend to drift into such relationships without focusing on the future or its legal 
implications.” DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER:  SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 
138 (1989). 
 299. Deborah Zalesne, The Contractual Family:  The Role of the Market in Shaping Family 
Formations and Rights, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1027, 1039 (2015) (“[E]ven today, Illinois, 
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Marvin and its progeny only offer limited protections.  Specifically, state law 
protections for cohabitants typically require that the parties entered into an 
agreement regarding their respective rights.300  While some states permit 
implied agreements, others require that they be express.301  Some states even 
insist that the agreements be in writing.302  Regardless, by conditioning legal 
protection on the existence of a contract, relatively few cohabitants are likely 
to benefit given that, as one commentator aptly notes, “[i]f couples do not in 
fact think of their relationship in contract terms, then a doctrine that directs 
courts to decide their disputes by looking for a contract is unlikely to find 
one.”303 
Nonetheless, two states that do offer protections for cohabitants whose 
relationship has ended analogize to the states’ divorce laws.  For example, 
the Supreme Court of Nevada has held that property that cohabitants agreed 
to hold “as if they were married” is subject to the state’s community property 
laws.304  In so ruling, the court emphasized that it “by no means seeks to 
encourage, nor does this opinion suggest, that couples should avoid 
marriage.”305  Instead, the court “reaffirm[ed] this state’s strong public policy 
interest in encouraging legally consummated marriages.”306  Nonetheless, 
the court pointed out that “this policy is not furthered by allowing one 
participant . . . to abscond with the bulk of the couple’s acquisitions.”307 
Washington has gone one step further and eschews the contract approach 
altogether, focusing instead on the existence of “a stable, marital-like 
relationship.”308  For cohabitants who establish the existence of such a 
relationship (sometimes referred to as the “meretricious relationship test”309), 
the Supreme Court of Washington has held that “income and property 
acquired during [the relationship] should be characterized in a similar manner 
 
Georgia, and Louisiana still do not recognize cohabitation contracts between either opposite-
sex or same-sex couples.”). 
 300. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for 
Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 262 (describing the “contract-based” approach as 
the “default framework”). 
 301. See, e.g., Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (N.Y. 1980) (“The notion of an 
implied contract between an unmarried couple living together is, thus, contrary to both New 
York decisional law and the implication arising from our Legislature’s abolition of common-
law marriage.”). 
 302. See Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805, 832 n.103 
(2008) (“At least three states require a written contract when the consideration is nonmarital 
conjugal cohabitation.”). 
 303. Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” Was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1365, 1368 (2001). 
 304. W. States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Nev. 1992). 
 305. Id. at 1223. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. at 1223–24. 
 308. See Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (“A meretricious 
relationship is a stable, marital-like relationship where both parties cohabit with knowledge 
that a lawful marriage between them does not exist.”). 
 309. See generally Gavin M. Parr, What Is a “Meretricious Relationship”?:  An Analysis 
of Cohabitant Property Rights Under Connell v. Francisco, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1243 (1999). 
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as income and property acquired during marriage.”310  Washington courts 
have even applied this approach to same-sex cohabitants, giving them 
marriage-like remedies years before the state would permit same-sex 
marriage.  Consider, for instance, a 2004 case in which Lynn Gormley and 
Julia Robertson were involved in a ten-year relationship.311  After examining 
the nature of the couple’s relationship, the court ruled that they were entitled 
to an equitable division of property.312 
In so ruling, the court rejected the argument that, because the two women 
could not legally marry, their relationship could not be construed as quasi-
marital:  “[I]t is of no consequence to the cohabitating couple, same-sex or 
otherwise, whether they can legally marry.  Indeed, one of the key elements 
of a meretricious relationship is knowledge by the partners that a lawful 
marriage between them does not exist.”313  While agreeing that “[w]hether 
same-sex couples can legally marry is for the legislature to decide,” the court 
concluded that the duty to “‘examine the [meretricious] relationship and the 
property accumulations and make a just and equitable disposition of the 
property’ is a judicial, not a legislative, extension of the rights and protections 
of marriage to intimate, unmarried cohabitants.”314 
D.  Informal Adoption 
States have not only relied on informal acts to award marital benefits; they 
also permit informal acts to justify recognition of certain parent-child 
relationships.  One such example is the doctrine of equitable adoption, also 
referred to as virtual adoption, de facto adoption, and adoption by 
estoppel.315  Equitable adoption is designed to protect an individual who 
mistakenly believes themselves to be the legal child (whether biological or 
through adoption) of another.316  The doctrine, which has been recognized in 
a majority of the states,317 typically arises in the context of parental 
disinheritance, but courts have also relied on the doctrine in other areas as 
 
 310. Connell, 898 P.2d at 836. 
 311. Gormley v. Robertson, 83 P.3d 1042, 1043 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
 312. Id. at 1046–47.  “They pooled their resources and acquired property as well as debt.  
They had a joint banking account that was used to pay all monthly obligations, whether 
preexisting or incurred separately or jointly.” Id. at 1044. 
 313. Id. at 1045. 
 314. Id. at 1046 (quoting In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 331 (Wash. 1984) (en 
banc)). 
 315. See Michael J. Higdon, When Informal Adoption Meets Intestate Succession:  The 
Cultural Myopia of the Equitable Adoption Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225 
(2008). 
 316. See Lindsay Ayn Warner, Bending the Bow of Equity:  Three Ways Florida Can 
Improve Its Equitable Adoption Policy, 38 STETSON L. REV. 577, 585 (2009) (explaining that 
equitable adoption protects the interests of children who, though blameless, were never legally 
adopted by their adoptive parents). 
 317. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Grandparents Raising Grandchildren and the Implications 
for Inheritance, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 6 (2006) (“Since at least twenty-eight states do recognize 
equitable adoption, the doctrine remains a theoretical option in a majority of states.”). 
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well, including divorce proceedings318 and claims of parental rights.319  
Historically, equitable adoption has been “predicated upon principles of 
contract law and equitable enforcement of [an] agreement to adopt.”320  Thus, 
courts have typically required the existence of an adoption contract before 
permitting a party to pursue a claim for equitable adoption.321 
Requiring the existence of a contract, however, can work great injustice.  
The case of O’Neal v. Wilkes322 provides an excellent example.  There, Hattie 
O’Neal was a child born in 1949 to an unwed mother who died when Hattie 
was only eight years old.323  After living with her paternal aunt for some 
time, Hattie was placed with a married couple, Mr. and Mrs. Roswell Cook, 
who were looking to adopt a little girl.324  Although the Cooks never formally 
adopted Hattie, from the time she went home with the Cooks until she 
married in 1975, she was in all meaningful ways their daughter.325  After 
Hattie left their home and got married, she continued her relationship with 
the Cooks, who referred to Hattie’s children as their grandchildren.326  When 
Mr. Cook died without a will, Hattie brought suit, claiming that Cook had 
adopted her by way of a virtual adoption and, as such, she was entitled to 
inherit from him.327  The Supreme Court of Georgia refused Hattie’s claim 
for the sole reason that her aunt did not have the legal authority to enter into 
an adoption contract with the Cooks.328 
Recognizing the unfairness that can arise from such a rigid requirement, a 
number of states have instead started to rely “on equitable principles of 
fairness and intent rather than the ordinary rules of contract law.”329  
Consider, for instance, the 2013 case of DeHart v. DeHart330 in which the 
Supreme Court of Illinois was confronted with an individual who was 
disinherited by the man he had always believed to be his father.331  The 
 
 318. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 109 (N.D. 2000) (“The substantive 
circumstances of this case, a divorce in which child support was requested, are identical to the 
other cases in which husbands have been held to have equitably adopted children for the 
purposes of imposing child support.”). 
 319. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Boynes, 396 P.3d 774, 779 (Nev. 2017) (concluding “that the 
district court did not err in granting [respondent] paternity through equitable adoption of the 
child”). 
 320. Lankford v. Wright, 489 S.E.2d 604, 606 (N.C. 1997) (quoting 2 AM. JUR. 2d Adoption 
§ 53 (1994)). 
 321. See Higdon, supra note 315, at 225 (“[T]he tests that courts have developed to 
determine whether an equitable adoption exists almost invariably require that there first have 
been a contract to adopt between the natural and ‘foster’ parents.”). 
 322. 439 S.E.2d 490 (Ga. 1994). 
 323. Id. at 491. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. (“Although O’Neal was never statutorily adopted by Cook, he raised her and 
provided for her education and she resided with him until her marriage in 1975.”). 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. at 492 (“Because O’Neal’s relatives did not have the legal authority to enter into a 
contract for her adoption, their alleged ratification of the adoption contract was of no legal 
effect.”). 
 329. DeHart v. DeHart, 986 N.E.2d 85, 103 (Ill. 2013). 
 330. 986 N.E.2d 85 (Ill. 2013). 
 331. Id. at 90–91. 
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plaintiff, James DeHart, was born in 1944.332  For almost sixty years, the 
decedent, Donald DeHart, had represented himself to the community as 
James’s biological father.333  In addition, Donald even provided James with 
a birth certificate that seemingly confirmed his parentage.334  In 2000, 
however, James obtained a certified copy of his birth certificate, and it made 
clear that his father was someone other than Donald.335 
Donald subsequently conceded that he was not James’s biological father 
but that he had nonetheless adopted James in 1946.336  Consistent with that 
representation, Donald continued to hold James out as his son.337  When 
Donald subsequently died in 2007, however, his will included the statement, 
“I have no children” and, indeed, it appeared that he had lied about having 
adopted James.338  In the will, Donald left nothing to James and instead left 
everything to a woman Donald had wed just two years prior to his death.339  
James filed a challenge to the will, arguing in part that he had been equitably 
adopted by Donald.340  Although Donald’s widow disputed the claim, the 
court ruled in James’s favor, holding that, “where there is sufficient, 
objective evidence of an intent to adopt (or fraudulently or mistakenly 
holding out as a natural child on a continual basis), supported by a close 
enduring familial relationship, . . . equitable adoption [will] be 
recognized.”341 
In so ruling, Illinois joined other states that have permitted equitable 
adoption claims even in the absence of a formal adoption contract.  West 
Virginia was seemingly the first state to do so when its highest court stated 
that, “[w]hile the existence of an express contract of adoption is very 
convincing evidence, an implied contract of adoption is an unnecessary 
fiction created by courts as a protection from fraudulent claims.”342  
Accordingly, the court held that an equitable adoption could take place even 
without a contract to adopt, so long as the proponent “can, by clear, cogent 
and convincing evidence, prove sufficient facts to convince the trier of fact 
that his status is identical to that of a formally adopted child, except only for 
the absence of a formal order of adoption.”343  California followed a similar 
approach in 2004 when its highest court held that one who claims to be an 
equitably adopted child need only “demonstrate the existence of some direct 
 
 332. Id. at 90. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. (“Donald and plaintiff used the purported birth certificate, to conduct the affairs of 
life (until the year 2000), using it to enroll plaintiff in grade school and high school and using 
it to convey to those requesting proof of identity that plaintiff was Donald’s son.”). 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. (“Donald also explained in no uncertain terms that he had hired a lawyer in 
Homewood, Illinois, to handle the adoption so that ‘it was all legal.’”). 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. (“There is no legal documentation of an adoption in the record.”). 
 339. Id. at 90–91. 
 340. Id. at 91. 
 341. Id. at 104. 
 342. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co. v. Singer, 250 S.E.2d 369, 374 (W. Va. 1978). 
 343. Id. 
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expression, on the decedent’s part, of an intent to adopt the claimant.”344  The 
court explained that such intent could be established by the existence of “an 
unperformed express agreement or promise to adopt”345 but can also arise 
from “an invalid or unconsummated attempt to adopt, the decedent’s 
statement of his or her intent to adopt the child, or the decedent’s 
representation to the claimant or to the community at large that the claimant 
was the decedent’s natural or legally adopted child.”346 
E.  No Adoption and No Biological Link 
Somewhat related to equitable adoption is the concept of an equitable 
parent, which different courts have referred to as a quasi-parent, in loco 
parentis, and a psychological parent.347  Essentially, an equitable parent is 
one who gains some parental rights as a result of having acted as a parent to 
a legally unrelated child,348 typically with the consent of the legal parent.349  
In a growing number of cases, including Ramey v. Sutton,350 same-sex 
partners have relied on claims of equitable parenthood to gain parental rights 
over children with whom they lack a biological tie.  After all, medical science 
currently does not permit two people of the same gender to conceive,351 
meaning that children of same-sex couples will only have, at most, a 
biological connection with one member of the same-sex relationship. 
Those in same-sex relationships, of course, are not the first to bring such 
claims.  Individuals who have acted as quasi-parents have a long history of 
petitioning the courts for parental rights.  Although they have not always been 
successful, the point remains that this is yet one more area of family law 
where the courts have been willing to bestow familial rights on those who 
lack formal family relationships.  Before looking at those cases, however, it 
is important to understand that this is an area of the law that is rapidly 
evolving, due in large part to the fact that family complexity has changed 
drastically in the last few decades due to “higher rates of divorce, nonmarital 
childbearing, cohabitation, and remarriage.”352  As a consequence of these 
 
 344. Bean v. Ford (Estate of Ford), 82 P.3d 747, 754 (Cal. 2004). 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. 
 347. See Higdon, supra note 202, at 944. 
 348. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 
458 (2007) (defining a quasi-parent as “a person not a legal parent who nonetheless has greater 
rights in a contest with the legal parent than does any other third party”). 
 349. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Knott (In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.), 533 N.W.2d 419, 435 (Wis. 
1995) (adopting a four-part test “[t]o demonstrate the existence of the petitioner’s parent-like 
relationship with the child,” the first element of which is “that the biological or adoptive parent 
consented to, and fostered, the petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like 
relationship with the child”); see also supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 350. 362 P.3d 217 (Okla. 2015); see also supra notes 142–51 and accompanying text. 
 351. As advances in assisted reproduction continue, even this may change. See Michael 
Boucai, Is Assisted Procreation an LGBT Right?, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1065, 1093 (discussing 
technologies whereby sperm cells might be converted to egg cells and vice versa, permitting 
same-sex couples to reproduce). 
 352. Ariel Kalil et al., Time Investments in Children Across Family Structures, 654 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 150, 150 (2014). 
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new dynamics, children today are more likely to look to individuals as 
parents who are, in reality, legal strangers.353  Thus, courts are being asked 
to increasingly wrestle with the difficult question of, in the absence of a 
biological or legal connection to the child, whether an individual can ever 
become a parent.  And, if so, how is a court to reconcile that recognition with 
the parental rights of the child’s legal parents. 
In several cases, including claims brought by cohabitants, courts have 
seemed resistant to extend such recognition.  For instance, Donald Merkel 
cohabitated with his girlfriend, Tamera Cooper, and her son for seven 
years.354  Despite being neither the child’s legal nor biological father, Donald 
nonetheless assumed responsibility for helping raise the boy.355  When the 
relationship between the two adults ended, the Supreme Court of South 
Dakota refused to recognize him as an equitable parent:  “Before a parent’s 
right to custody over his or her own children will be disturbed in favor of a 
nonparent a clear showing against the parent of ‘gross misconduct or 
unfitness, or of other extraordinary circumstances affecting the welfare of the 
child’ is required.”356  Stepparents have faced similar difficulties.  For 
example, in a 2009 case out of Illinois, Nicholas Gansner and Miki Mancine 
were married a few months after Miki adopted a son, William.357  Nicholas 
never adopted William but nonetheless held himself out as William’s father 
and served as the child’s primary caregiver.358  When Miki filed for divorce, 
Nicholas petitioned for sole custody.359  The court, however, rejected his 
claim, noting that the state had not recognized equitable parentage and that 
Nicholas, despite knowing “at all times that he would have to formally adopt 
William in order to be his legal parent,” failed to do so.360 
Other courts have been more sympathetic to such claims.  For instance, in 
1992, a Minnesota court granted visitation to a stepfather, David Simmons, 
over the objections of the child’s mother, JoEllen Vasicheck.361  The couple 
had married in 1989.362  At the time, JoEllen had a five-year-old son from a 
previous relationship.363  When the couple separated eighteen months later, 
David petitioned the court for visitation.364  While acknowledging that “the 
 
 353. The term “legal stranger” is often used as a synonym for “nonparent.” See generally 
John DeWitt Gregory, Blood Ties:  A Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal Strangers, 55 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351 (1998) (using “nonparent” and “legal stranger” interchangeably); 
see also David D. Meyer, What Constitutional Law Can Learn from the ALI Principles of 
Family Dissolution, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1075, 1087 (noting that “long-time caregivers lacking 
biological or adoptive ties are classified as nonparents, or legal ‘strangers’”). 
 354. Cooper v. Merkel, 470 N.W.2d 253, 254 (S.D. 1991). 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. at 255 (quoting Langerman v. Langerman, 336 N.W.2d 669, 670 (S.D. 1983)). 
 357. In re Marriage of Mancine, 9 N.E.3d 550, 555 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). 
 358. Id. at 556. 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. at 568. 
 361. Simmons v. Simmons, 486 N.W.2d 788, 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
 362. Id. at 789. 
 363. Id. (“[The] biological father has had no contact with him and has surrendered his 
parental rights.”). 
 364. Id. at 790. 
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question of whether a former stepparent may assert a common-law right to 
visitation is one of first impression,” the trial court ruled in his favor.365  
Specifically, the court held that “a former stepparent who was in loco parentis 
with the former stepchild may be entitled to visitation under the common 
law.”366  Finding nothing in the record to contradict the trial court’s 
determination that visitation with David would be in the child’s best interest, 
the appellate court affirmed.367  A number of courts have offered similar 
relief to those who fail to qualify as legal parents.368 
Included within those cases are instances where courts have used equitable 
parentage to bestow parental rights on those in same-sex relationships.  For 
instance, a North Carolina court, applying the best interest of the child 
standard, awarded joint legal and physical custody of a child to the mother, 
Irene Dwinnell, and the mother’s former partner, Joellen Mason.369  
Although the mother argued that the ruling would infringe her constitutional 
rights to direct the upbringing of her child, the court announced that “[w]hen 
a legal parent invites a third party into a child’s life, and that invitation alters 
a child’s life by essentially providing him with another parent, the legal 
parent’s rights to unilaterally sever that relationship are necessarily 
reduced.”370  In so ruling, the court noted that the two women “lived together 
as a family and Dwinnell led her child to believe that Mason was one of his 
parents.”371 
These cases illustrate but a few examples of the evolving family forms that 
have led to increasing numbers of children being reared (sometimes 
exclusively) by those who fail to qualify as a formal legal parent.  These cases 
likewise reveal the degree to which the protections afforded to equitable 
parents vary by state.  In light of the harms that can befall children when 
those they see as parents are not treated as such by the law, a number of 
scholars have argued that state law needs to be more consistent when it comes 
to recognizing equitable parenthood and in providing equitable parents with 
legal parental rights.372  The same is true regarding backdating claims by 
those who are unable to count the pre-equality portion of a same-sex 
relationship toward a formal marriage given the unconstitutional laws 
prohibiting such unions.  Just as the states have found ways to award family-
 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. at 791.  According to the court, “[b]ecause [the statute] does not contain any clause 
specifically repealing, restricting, or abridging a non-parent’s common-law visitation rights, 
we construe the statute to extend and supplement the common-law rule.” Id. 
 367. Id. at 792. 
 368. At least one court has relied on equitable adoption to extend parental rights to a same-
sex spouse. See Stankevich v. Milliron, 882 N.W.2d 194, 198 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (ruling 
that a same-sex spouse could qualify as an “equitable parent” to the biological child of the 
other spouse when that child was born during the marriage). 
 369. Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 60 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). 
 370. Id. at 69 (quoting Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162, 169 (S.C. 2006)). 
 371. Id. at 68. 
 372. See Higdon, supra note 202, at 956 (“Although state variation is not an inherently bad 
thing, discrimination on the basis of family structure and the harm such discrimination plays 
in the lives of children is something the law should not tolerate.”). 
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like benefits to other relationships that fail to meet the formal requirements 
of family law, so too must they find ways to extend marital benefits to those 
who were in relationships that would have been marital had that been a legal 
option.  Although the states need not do so in the same precise way, it is the 
position of this Article that Obergefell demands some form of equitable 
remedy—one that currently does not exist in the law but for which the above 
equitable remedies are highly instructive. 
IV.  EQUITABLE MARRIAGE 
As detailed above, courts already use a number of equitable doctrines that 
enable them to extend family law protections to those who have spent time 
in informal family-like relationships.373  Each doctrine owes its existence to 
the courts’ desire to protect vulnerable citizens from the harms that can arise 
from misplaced reliance on the existence of a formal domestic relationship.  
Consider, for instance, someone who spends twenty years in a relationship 
that she believes to be a marriage.  Imagine that she does not work outside 
the home and all valuable property is in her spouse’s name.  If it were 
somehow revealed that the marriage was invalid, she would—absent some 
other remedy—be left with very little financially to show for those twenty 
years and have limited ability to now rebuild her life.  It is primarily within 
this space that these equitable doctrines operate.374  There is, however, 
another concern at play—the goal of fulfilling party expectations.375  As 
many courts have referenced when applying them, these doctrines concern 
individuals who entered into relationships in good faith, assuming that they 
would be protected or, at the very least, that they were not jeopardizing their 
economic self-interests in the process. 
Those concerns apply with equal force in the context of those who spent 
time in same-sex relationships that would have been marriages but for the 
unconstitutional laws preventing such unions.  In truth, these individuals are 
even more entitled to some sort of protection given the constitutional right at 
play.  As a number of scholars have made clear, a retroactive application of 
Obergefell is not merely good policy, it is constitutionally required.  For 
instance, Professor Lee-ford Tritt has concluded that “Obergefell should be 
 
 373. See supra Part III. 
 374. See supra notes 281, 307 and accompanying text. 
 375. See, e.g., Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., 302 P.3d 211, 216 (Cal. 2013) (“Our court 
made clear from the beginning that the fundamental purpose of the putative spouse doctrine 
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applied purely retroactively as to both choice-of-law matters and remedial 
considerations” so as to “rectif[y] the property deprivations of 
unconstitutional unrecognized marriages.”376  Similarly, Professor Nicolas 
explains that “backdating provides same-sex couples with the ‘make whole’ 
relief they are entitled to for past violations of their constitutional right to 
marry.”377  Such sentiments are consistent with what the Supreme Court 
itself has said regarding remedial decrees:  “[they] must be designed as nearly 
as possible ‘to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position 
they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct.’”378 
Thus, if individuals are to be provided with true marriage equality, some 
retroactivity is required.  Unfortunately, none of the existing doctrines is 
currently suited to address this particular situation.  As a result, these 
individuals require a new form of protection given that their relationships 
either ended before marriage equality became the law of the land or their 
eventual marriages fail to capture the true length of the relationship, on which 
a number of marital benefits are conditioned.379  The remainder of this part 
explores why, despite being inapposite in this context, the existing doctrines 
are nonetheless instructive when it comes to crafting a new equitable 
doctrine—referred to here as equitable marriage—that would offer the 
necessary protections.  With that in mind, this part then puts forth concrete 
suggestions on how equitable marriage should be applied and how courts 
should deal with the potential criticisms and complications that could arise. 
A.  Filling the Equitable Void 
To deal with same-sex relationships that predated marriage equality, one 
might ask why not simply bring back some form of common-law marriage?  
It is, after all, the only equitable doctrine of the five discussed that gives 
formal recognition, with all the attendant rights and obligations, to an 
informally created relationship.380  In contrast, the others merely provide for 
limited rights and remedies.  Additionally, there is some precedent for using 
common-law marriage in this context.  After Loving, courts took this 
approach to retroactively extend marriage equality to interracial relationships 
that were either already in existence381 or had ended before Loving.382  
Further, as discussed earlier, a few states have already relied on common-law 
marriage to retroactively convert some same-sex relationships into 
marriages.383 
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 380. See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text. 
 381. See Nicolas, supra note 26, at 424–25. 
 382. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lewis, 306 F. Supp. 1177, 1183–84 (N.D. Ala. 
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Nonetheless, there are a number of problems with relying on common-law 
marriage in this context.  First, compared to the legal landscape at the time 
Loving was decided, today, only a small number of states permit common-
law marriage and that number continues to dwindle.384  In 2019, for instance, 
the Supreme Court of South Carolina prospectively abolished the doctrine 
after finding that it violated the public policy of the state, which “is to 
promote predictable, just outcomes for all parties involved in these disputes, 
as well as to emphasize the sanctity of marital union.”385  Additionally, most 
states abolished common-law marriage through legislation,386 and thus, 
resurrecting the doctrine at this point could take considerable time and pose 
significant political challenges. 
Of greater salience, however, is the fact that the traditional tests for 
common-law marriage are largely based on outdated, heteronormative views 
of what a marriage should look like.  For instance, many states require that 
parties prove that they cohabitated and had a reputation in the community as 
being married in order to establish an informal marriage.387  However, 
relationships today—even formal marriages—are less likely to satisfy those 
elements.  Married couples are more likely today to live separately,388 and 
with the reduced societal stigma concerning romantic relationships outside 
of marriage, they are less likely to proclaim to those around them that they 
are, in fact, married.389  This is especially true when considering same-sex 
couples who may have feared discrimination and scorn had they openly 
shared their relationship status with others.  In that sense, cases dealing with 
common-law marriage claims involving interracial couples are instructive.  
For instance, in 1904, the Supreme Court of Missouri refused to recognize a 
common-law marriage between a couple that had lived together for thirty 
years, had eight children, and referred to one another as husband and wife.390  
The problem was that the two failed the reputation requirement because “he 
was never known to be with her and acknowledge her as his wife outside of 
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his own house.”391  The reason he had not done so was clearly because he 
was white and she was Black, but the court gave no weight to that fact.392 
There is one final reason that common-law marriage does not work 
particularly well in the context of same-sex relationships that predate 
marriage equality, and it is a problem also shared by the marriage validation 
principles of marriage by estoppel and putative marriage—namely, all three 
operate on the assumption that there was in fact a marriage, albeit one that is 
invalid or was entered into informally.  Indeed, the essential requirement for 
common-law marriage is a shared intent of the parties to be legally 
married.393  Thus, common-law marriage requires not that the parties 
subjectively believed their relationship to be the equivalent of a marriage but 
that they intended to enter into a relationship that they believed would be 
recognized as a legal marriage.394  In fact, states that allow common-law 
marriage require the parties to have first had the capacity to marry, meaning 
that they could have obtained a formal marriage had they so chosen.395  
However, at the heart of the marriage equality movement lies the fact that 
same-sex couples were denied that capacity.  Thus, for those who entered 
into same-sex relationships before gaining the right to legally wed, they may 
have considered themselves the equivalent of married, but they were always 
well aware that it was an extralegal relationship that came with no marital 
benefits or protections.396 
Likewise, marriage by estoppel assumes that, although there may have 
been an invalid divorce, there was a subsequent marriage ceremony that was 
otherwise valid.397  Thus, the doctrine has limited utility here—besides the 
fact it only operates in a very specific factual setting, a subsequent marriage 
was something same-sex couples simply could not obtain prior to marriage 
equality.  Similarly, the putative spouse doctrine requires a showing that there 
was a marriage ceremony and that the parties entered into that “marriage” in 
good faith.398  Again, prior to earning the right to marry, same-sex couples 
could not meet that requirement.  It is true that the law could retroactively 
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treat—as some states have done through legislation399—civil unions and 
domestic partnerships as marriages, but that too fails because:  (1) relatively 
few states even offered those marriage alternatives400 and (2) like marriage 
equality itself, those options did not become available until after many same-
sex couples had already spent years in committed relationships.401  Finally, 
a putative spouse is not entitled to the full panoply of marital benefits, thus 
making it less than an ideal template in this context.402 
For that reason, the law of cohabitation may appear a better alternative, but 
it too fails in this context.  First, the doctrine and its attendant remedies are 
directed solely at nonmarriage, and to achieve true marriage equality, there 
needs to be some mechanism for treating an informal relationship as an actual 
marriage.  Second, most states that permit cohabitants to avail themselves of 
marriage-like protections do so through contract law—often requiring 
express, written agreements.403  The contract requirement is problematic here 
because, even if one could succeed on that theory, the remedy is limited to 
the terms of the contract and not the full range of marriage benefits.  Further, 
it is unlikely that same-sex couples who were in committed relationships 
awaiting the right to legally marry would have even thought of their 
relationships as contracts, much less have thought of them in express terms 
that they then reduced to writing.  There is, however, at least one state that 
does not require an agreement but instead looks to the quality of the 
relationship.404  Nonetheless, it still only provides successful litigants with 
some of the benefits of marriage.  It does not permit a finding that the couple 
was in fact married, thus it denies them the full “constellation of benefits” to 
which Obergefell spoke.405 
What remains, then, are the equitable doctrines relating to parent-child 
relationships.  Although neither pertains to marriage, they nonetheless 
provide helpful examples of how courts have constructed remedies that 
extend family law protections to those who fail—at least formally—to 
qualify as a “family.”  As an initial matter, they both share the same defects 
as some of the other doctrines, most notably the limited remedies they 
provide.  For instance, succeeding as an equitable parent merely offers the 
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possibility of some discrete parental rights—the equitable parent is still not 
recognized as a legal parent.406  Likewise, establishing that one has been 
equitably adopted only provides limited remedies vis-à-vis the rights 
afforded to formally adopted children.407  Further, as detailed earlier, most 
states are fairly formalistic when it comes to applying these doctrines.  In 
equitable adoption, for example, most courts insist on the existence of an 
unfulfilled adoption contract, which may be unusual in situations where 
informal adoption is likely to occur.408  Relatedly, equitable parentage cases 
often focus too much on the role the legal parent played in cultivating the 
relationship between the child and the quasi-parent and not enough on the 
quality of the relationship that developed between the two or the harm that 
would result from failing to protect that relationship.409 
Nonetheless, a survey of the states that have applied these doctrines reveals 
that a few have instead adopted a more nuanced approach, one that is similar 
to how Washington deals with unmarried partners.410  Specifically, these 
courts have utilized a functional approach, which “focuses the inquiry on 
whether the relationship at issue shares the essential characteristics of a 
traditionally accepted relationship and fulfills the same human needs.”411  
Although such an approach might appear to be the minority approach 
regarding these doctrines, family law as a whole has increasingly moved in 
the functional direction.412  This Article contends that a similar approach 
would also be well suited to this context and provide courts with the 
necessary flexibility to examine same-sex relationships that predated 
marriage equality. 
Thus, what courts need is a new doctrine, equitable marriage, which would 
draw on elements of the existing approaches to recognizing informal 
relationships.  At a minimum, this doctrine would need to give the courts 
license to extend benefits to a marriage-like relationship that cannot 
otherwise qualify as a legal marriage.  In that sense, this new doctrine would 
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be similar to the marriage validation principles of marriage by estoppel and 
putative marriage, which protect void marriages, and equitable parentage and 
adoption, which protect informal parent-child relationships.  However, 
unlike those doctrines, this new equitable doctrine needs to provide not just 
some family law protections but all of the rights and obligations associated 
with marriage.  In that sense, as a remedy, it would be akin to common-law 
marriage, which confers all the benefits associated with formal marriage.  At 
the same time, however, the approach that is needed in this context cannot 
share common-law marriage’s rigid, outdated definition of marriage.  Nor, 
like typical cohabitation law and equitable adoption, can it blindly insist on 
the existence of a contractual relationship.  Instead, it should be more 
functional, similar to that taken by a minority of courts regarding 
cohabitation, equitable adoption, and equitable parentage.  Finally, given the 
fundamental right at issue, this doctrine requires nationwide application (in 
whatever precise form each state decides) to remedy the constitutional harms 
that stem from the states’ history of refusing to permit same-sex marriage. 
B.  Applying Equitable Marriage 
At its most basic level, equitable marriage would allow an individual who 
spent time in a same-sex relationship prior to the legalization of same-sex 
marriage to argue that some portion of that relationship should be considered 
either the equivalent of a legal marriage or, in the case of a couple that 
ultimately did wed, as part of that eventual marriage.  To prevail, a claimant 
would have to demonstrate that the parties would have wed during that period 
if the law had permitted them to do so.  For those who succeed, the court 
would then rule that there was a legal marriage during that period of the 
relationship—a remedy that, like common-law marriage, brings with it all 
the “same terms and conditions” as formal marriage.413 
Given the large number of LGBTQIA+ Americans living today who were 
in same-sex relationships impacted by the denial of marriage equality, it is 
likely that individuals from this group will be asking courts for such relief 
for years to come.  As courts grapple with how to respond to such claims, 
equitable marriage offers a way of not only addressing them but doing so in 
a way that fulfills Obergefell’s promise of true marriage equality.  Still, as 
courts implement such a doctrine, a number of questions are likely to arise—
questions the remainder of this section identifies and attempts to address. 
1.  Who Has Standing? 
As an initial matter, the question arises as to who would be permitted to 
raise an equitable marriage claim and whether there would be any time limits 
for doing so.  There are two groups of people who could conceivably raise 
such claims.  First are those individuals who ultimately wed same-sex 
partners with whom they had enjoyed nonmarital relationships prior to 
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obtaining the right to legally wed.414  The second group includes those who 
were in nonmarital relationships that ended, either through divorce or 
dissolution, prior to the arrival of formal marriage equality.  Individuals in 
either category would have the potential to raise a claim of equitable 
marriage. 
It would only be a potential claim given that some states may opt to impose 
some time limits.  There are two such restrictions that could come into play.  
First, for those who ultimately did wed and are seeking to backdate their 
wedding dates to an earlier point in time, there is the question of how soon 
after obtaining the right to marry the couple wed.  For instance, claimants 
would certainly be more sympathetic if they requested and received a 
marriage license the very day their state started issuing marriage licenses.  
For those who did not immediately wed, however, the issue gets a bit more 
complicated.  Planning a wedding can certainly take time, but imagine a 
couple that waited five years after their state started issuing licenses before 
finally entering into a formal marriage.  Given that marital backdating would 
remain somewhat of an extraordinary remedy, the states may feel it only fair 
to reserve that remedy to those who promptly did all they could to formalize 
their relationships once given the ability to do so.  Thus, it may well be that 
states would be correct in refusing claims for equitable marriage by those 
who waited too long to marry after receiving the right to do so. 
States must be mindful, however, of not unfairly punishing those who did 
not immediately wed.  For a historical example, consider how the Southern 
states, following passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, forced former slaves 
to either promptly wed or face criminal conviction.  Specifically, “[t]hose 
who were already in cohabiting relationships were told to immediately 
legalize their unions and legitimize their children and grandchildren.”415  At 
least one Southern state gave the former slaves just six months to do so or 
subject themselves “to criminal prosecution for adultery and fornication.”416  
Thus, as Professor Katherine M. Franke has discussed, “the robust 
enforcement of bigamy, fornication, and adultery laws served to domesticate 
African American people who were either unaware of, or ignored, the formal 
requirements of marital formation and dissolution.”417 
In requiring that same-sex couples promptly marry to evidence an 
intention to wed earlier than they had been legally permitted to do so, states 
must be mindful that imposing too short a deadline would continue to 
promote the very discrimination Obergefell was aimed at ending.  There is, 
unfortunately, one case where that has already occurred.  In Ferry v. De 
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Longhi America, Inc.,418 a case arising out of California, Patrick Ferry and 
Randy Sapp started living together in 1985.419  In 1993, they “were married 
in a religious ceremony performed by a religious leader pursuant to the 
principles of [their] beliefs.”420  The two men lived together until December 
2013, when Randy tragically died as a result of a heater that allegedly 
malfunctioned.421  When Patrick brought a wrongful death action, the 
manufacturer moved to dismiss on the basis that Patrick was not Randy’s 
legal spouse and, thus, lacked standing.422  The court agreed, noting that 
same-sex marriage became legal in California in June 2013 and, thus, the two 
men could have legally wed prior to Randy’s death if they had so intended.423  
In essence, then, the two men had lived as a married couple for over thirty 
years but were punished for not obtaining a marriage license in the six months 
between finally gaining the right to do so and Randy’s death. 
A second potential time restriction relates to when someone could bring a 
claim for equitable marriage.  For those who ultimately wed, it would seem 
they would have to bring a claim at the point in time—most likely death or 
divorce—when they are being denied a marriage benefit on the basis of 
marital length.  However, states might do what Utah has done regarding 
common-law marriage and condition backdating on the requirement that the 
spouses first petition the court, either during the relationship or within one 
year of its termination, for an order setting the start date of their marriage at 
a point earlier than when they formally wed.424  The benefit of such an 
approach is that it forces individuals in this position to ask for backdating 
sooner rather than later, when problems of proof may be exacerbated by the 
passage of time or the death or incapacity of one of the spouses. 
The question is more complex, though, when applied to those whose same-
sex relationships ended before they were permitted to marry.  To illustrate, 
consider two men who were in a long-term relationship that began in 1995 
but ended in 2010 when the couple decided to go their separate ways.  One 
of the men dies in 2021.  The other wants to claim that he should receive 
widower’s benefits, and so he brings a claim for equitable marriage in which 
he argues that the two would have wed prior to 2010 if permitted to do so.  
There are a few ways states might deal with such issues.  First, the court could 
simply treat it as a marriage that was never legally terminated.  That would 
pose problems if either had subsequently remarried.  However, under the 
subsequent marriage presumption, most states would honor the later 
marriage, presuming that the earlier one ended in divorce before the 
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subsequent marriage took place, and it would be very hard for the surviving 
partner to prove otherwise.425  If neither had remarried, then the claimant 
would be permitted to prove the existence of an equitable marriage. 
A better solution, however, might be for states to create a statute of 
limitations that applies to those who wish to have a pre-equality relationship 
adjudicated a marriage.  Texas, for instance, provides that a claimant’s ability 
to establish a common-law marriage will fail “[i]f a proceeding in which a 
marriage is to be proved . . . is not commenced before the second anniversary 
of the date on which the parties separated and ceased living together.”426  
States could implement something similar regarding equitable marriage for 
those who seek marital benefits from a relationship that ended before the 
arrival of formal marriage equality.  However, the event that would start the 
clock in this context would likely need to be the date on which the state began 
recognizing equitable marriage, given that many of these relationships might 
have already ended many years earlier. 
2.  How Would a Claimant Prove an Equitable Marriage? 
One might ask, given the deprivations they have faced regarding marriage, 
why not simply give same-sex couples the benefit of the doubt and 
automatically presume that any relationship that existed prior to marriage 
equality was a marriage and is entitled to all the corresponding rights and 
benefits?  There are two responses to that question.  First, such a permissive 
approach could very easily give rise to fraudulent claims, especially 
considering that such claims might not arise until after the alleged spouse has 
died.  Second, marriage does not simply bring benefits, it also brings 
obligations.  Accordingly, whenever an individual succeeds in backdating a 
same-sex marriage, that person’s spouse then has marital obligations—
obligations that person may have never intended to bear.  In other words, 
backdating a same-sex marriage might be very beneficial to one spouse, but 
it can also be quite damaging to the other.427  Thus, more careful 
consideration is required if the law is to adequately protect both members of 
the same-sex couple. 
Indeed, not every same-sex relationship that came into being prior to 
formal marriage equality would have been a marriage.  To begin with, the 
decision to marry typically does not arise until after some period of 
courtship,428 which usually takes as much time as the couple deems 
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necessary.  Thus, just because a claimant can prove the existence of a pre-
equality relationship, does not mean the parties would have been married at 
that previous point in time.  Further, with the reduced social stigma 
associated with cohabitation,429 a growing number of different-sex couples 
consciously choose not to marry, and those same considerations might have 
easily influenced same-sex couples to elect to do the same even if they had 
had the option of marrying.  Additionally, some same-sex couples may have 
possessed unique reasons for rejecting the idea of marriage, most notable of 
which is the belief of some in the LGBTQIA+ community that “it puts undue 
emphasis on a heteronormative institution.”430  As one commentator recently 
described, “[g]ay marriage is not without controversy, even among LGBT 
rights activists.  Queer theorists, radical feminists, and libertarians like Judith 
Butler, Martha Fineman, and David Boaz, reject gay marriage and advocate 
for the abolition of marriage in general.”431 
Thus, for all those reasons, the question arises as to how courts are to, ex 
post, differentiate between same-sex relationships that would have been 
marriages and those that would not have.  Even for those that would have 
been marriages at some point prior to formal marriage equality, the question 
becomes, when did the relationship reach that point?  All of these questions 
are made even more complicated by the fact that, once the same-sex 
relationship ends, the two parties may have very different perspectives on 
what was intended at any one point in time.  And, as Professor Kaiponanea 
Matsumura has pointed out, “[a]n individual’s right to autonomous self-
definition does not extend to conscription of an unwilling partner.”432  Thus, 
failure to get it right could be quite damaging to one or both individuals in 
the same-sex relationship. 
Consider, for instance, Estate of Leyton v. Hunter,433 where a New York 
court declined to backdate a same-sex marriage when doing so would have 
harmed the surviving member of that relationship.434  There, Mauricio 
Leyton’s mother and sister brought suit to have his former partner, David 
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Hunter, disqualified as a beneficiary under Mauricio’s will.435  When 
Mauricio died, his will identified David as his “former romantic partner and 
long-time friend.”436  Mauricio’s family argued that, under New York law, 
David was a “former spouse,” and thus he should be disqualified as a 
beneficiary.437  The two men were never formally married.  They did, 
however, have a commitment ceremony in 2002 but eventually separated.438  
As a result, Mauricio’s family argued that “because the minister at the 
commitment ceremony observed that [Mauricio and David] were entering 
into a state of companionship that the world recognizes as marriage, they 
were in fact married, and therefore their subsequent separation was a 
divorce.”439  The lower court denied the family members’ claim on the basis 
that same-sex marriage was not permitted in New York until 2011.440  The 
appellate court affirmed and further noted that Obergefell “does not compel 
a retroactive declaration” that a marriage existed in this instance, holding that 
“according the union between decedent and Hunter retroactive legal effect 
would be inconsistent with their understanding that they had never been 
legally married.”441 
The challenge, then, is “to design clear criteria that separate marriage-like 
unions from those in which the parties are not married because they do not 
want marital commitment or obligations.”442  And when it comes to setting 
that criteria, at least one scholar has advocated for “bright-line markers.”443  
Specifically, Professor Allison Tait has proposed that courts look to 
“instances of clear legal intention to form an economic partnership.”444  Tait 
includes within that category asset-specific events, such as the purchase of a 
family home; the date upon which the couple entered into an alternative 
marital state, like a civil union or a domestic partnership; and other legal 
contracts that signal “shared purpose and relationship commitment.”445  It is 
the position of this Article that these “legal markers” would indeed be 
excellent indicators for courts to rely on when deciding whether a same-sex 
relationship that predated marriage equality would have been marital or was 
instead intentionally nonmarital. 
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Courts, however, must be willing to delve deeper.  As discussed earlier in 
the context of cohabitation and equitable adoption,446 relying too heavily on 
legal formalities will precipitate discrimination against a number of same-
sex couples.  For instance, only a small number of states even permitted 
same-sex couples to enter into civil unions and domestic partnerships.447  
Thus, those who lived in states without that option would be at a disadvantage 
if courts were to place undue weight on those marriage alternatives.  Further, 
even those states that did offer that option did so only relatively recently,448 
meaning that many individuals in those states had already spent years in a 
same-sex relationship before they even had the choice of entering into a civil 
union or domestic partnership. 
Somewhat relatedly, if courts were to rely too heavily on contractual 
arrangements between same-sex partners—such as designated beneficiary or 
cohabitation agreements449—as a proxy for their earlier desire to marry, that 
would penalize those individuals who were ignorant of such options or who 
lacked access to the legal representation required to effectuate such 
agreements.450  Relying too heavily on the acquisition of joint property, like 
a family home, would likewise have a disproportionate impact on those who 
were in less affluent relationships—ones that could not afford such 
purchases.  In short, relying exclusively on “bright-line” markers would fail 
to account for various ways in which same-sex couples might have expressed 
their commitment to one another when formal marriage was not an option. 
As a result, it is the position of this Article that courts should look beyond 
discrete markers and instead adopt a more functional approach.  Unlike the 
more rigid approaches courts have taken regarding cohabitation and 
equitable adoption, courts should permit claimants to rely on other evidence 
that the couple would have married had that option been available.  For 
instance, as evidenced by the equitable parentage cases discussed above,451 
a couple’s decision to have and jointly raise children should likewise have 
bearing on the question of equitable marriage.  States that permit common-
law marriage already take into account such evidence when deciding whether 
there was an informal marriage452 and it would thus seem odd to apply a more 
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restrictive test here in light of the remedial nature of a doctrine like equitable 
marriage, especially when such a remedy is likely constitutionally required. 
Similarly, the cohabitation and reputation requirements of common-law 
marriage should likewise play some role in equitable marriage.  Individuals 
who were in same-sex relationships that involved many years of living 
together should be able to at least present such evidence for the court to 
consider.  After all, “in the case of long-term relationships—especially those 
accompanied by economic dependency and specification of roles—extra-
contractual considerations like protecting weaker, dependent parties, take on 
a greater weight.”453  Indeed, as one scholar points out, “long-term 
cohabitation and joint ownership of property might be the best indicator that 
two people expect to be able to liveout [sic] their lives enjoying the jointly-
owned property.”454  So too should those who publicly represented 
themselves as being in a committed relationship—either through general 
reputation in the community or through informal declarations like a 
commitment ceremony—be permitted to rely on that evidence to prove that 
they would have married had that choice been available. 
This is not to say that any of this evidence, by itself, should be dispositive 
of an earlier intent to wed.  After all, the evidence could objectively indicate 
more than one possible intent and the parties themselves may not be 
particularly helpful in sorting that out given that “at the dissolution of a 
relationship, parties may easily disagree or remember differently what intent 
existed at what point in time.”455  Nonetheless, to foreclose claimants even 
raising such evidence, and instead allow only specific events to serve as 
evidence of marital intent, would fail to recognize the nuance that is 
necessary to achieve true marriage equality in any meaningful way.456  As 
Professor Jeffrey Evan Stake observed:  “What different people want and 
expect out of marriage, and divorce, is not the same, probably ought not be 
the same, and in any case cannot be made the same.”457 
That last point has particular salience in this context.  Namely, homosexual 
relationships are not identical to heterosexual relationships.  Many of those 
who spent time in same-sex relationships prior to marriage equality grew up 
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in a society where marriage was not only impossible but the relationships 
they were permitted to have were both marginalized and, in many respects, 
demonized.  In light of those societal forces, it is entirely reasonable to 
assume that those same-sex relationships would look somewhat different 
from traditional marriages that were occurring around the same time.  Thus, 
as courts go about trying to discern whether a prior same-sex relationship 
would have been a marriage, they must be careful to not be overly swayed 
by heterosexist conceptions of what marriage should look like.458  In that 
sense, the words of scholar Paula Ettlebrick, which she uttered in 1989 when 
marriage equality was only a whisper, are particularly instructive:  “The 
moment we argue . . . that we should be treated as equals because we are 
really just like married couples and hold the same values to be true, we 
undermine the very purpose of our movement and begin the dangerous 
process of silencing our different voices.”459 
Many of these differences were explored above when discussing how 
common-law marriage provides a less than ideal remedy in this context.460  
Specifically, same-sex couples who faced discrimination and hostility over 
their relationship status may have been less likely to live together or 
announce their relationship status to the larger community.  But there is 
another key difference as well and it relates to the gender stereotypes often 
associated with marriage.  As courts attempt to look back in time to determine 
whether a same-sex relationship would have been a marriage, they will be 
unable to rely on the popular stereotypes of the “working husband” and 
“homemaker wife.”  There is a great deal of literature about how so much of 
family law has been built on those stereotypes,461 but one of the most recent 
examples, which is particularly instructive in this context, is the law of 
nonmarriage and cohabitation.  As Professor Albertina Antognini has pointed 
out, in looking at cases that wrestle with whether to extend marital benefits 
to cohabitating couples based on how closely those relationships resemble a 
marriage, “[t]he overarching definition of marriage that these decisions 
impose is one steeped in archetypal gender relations.”462  When analyzing 
relationships involving two men or two women, however, such defaults are 
even less likely to be effective and, thus, the law must “confront[] the 
sleeping dog, by challenging the rigidity of gender role and identity that 
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conspires with political will to deny the creative possibility and richness in 
all lives of committed intimate relation.”463 
Thus, just as Obergefell distilled marriage down to the four essential 
attributes that rendered it a fundamental right,464 so too must courts discern 
what are the hallmarks of marital relationships—after heterosexist notions 
are stripped away—that would allow an individual in a same-sex relationship 
to prove an intent to be married during a time when that right was being 
unconstitutionally denied.  Although the above discussion attempts to 
delineate what form this evidence might take, courts must be mindful of the 
lens through which they view that evidence.  In short, it is no longer 
permissible to use the pre-Obergefell construction of marriage. 
CONCLUSION 
In Obergefell, when discussing the flexible role that history and tradition 
play in constitutional jurisprudence, the majority noted it “respects our 
history and learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the 
present.”465  Similarly, the courts cannot allow unconstitutional deprivations 
from the past to continue harming people in the present.  Thus, as courts 
wrestle with how to fulfill Obergefell’s promise of true marriage equality, 
they must be mindful of all the individuals who continue to face harm as a 
result of the states’ denial of same-sex marriage through laws that, until 2015, 
were considered perfectly legal in many states.  Although some courts have 
begun experimenting with ways to backdate marriages and thus ameliorate 
those harms, states have done so on an inconsistent basis and none have 
fashioned remedies that adequately capture the unique and varied attributes 
of same-sex relationships in the United States.  Thus, it is the position of this 
Article that states must do more.  Specifically, by borrowing and expanding 
on the equitable doctrines that already exist for awarding family law benefits 
to those in informal family-like relationships, the states must develop a 
doctrine for recognizing equitable marriage to protect the rights and interests 
of those individuals who spent time in relationships that would have been 
marriages had an unconstitutional law not stood firmly in the way.  In that 
respect, the words of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in United States v. 
Virginia466 are instructive:  “A remedial decree . . . must closely fit the 
constitutional violation; it must be shaped to place persons unconstitutionally 
denied an opportunity or advantage in ‘the position they would have occupied 
in the absence of [discrimination].’”467 
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